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THE OTHER MADISON PROBLEM
David S. Schwartz* & John Mikhail**
The conventional view of legal scholars and historians is that James
Madison was the “father” or “major architect” of the Constitution, whose
unrivaled authority entitles his interpretations of the Constitution to special
weight and consideration. This view greatly exaggerates Madison’s
contribution to the framing of the Constitution and the quality of his insight
into the main problem of federalism that the Framers tried to solve. Perhaps
most significantly, it obstructs our view of alternative interpretations of the
original Constitution with which Madison disagreed.
Examining Madison’s writings and speeches between the spring and fall
of 1787, we argue, first, that Madison’s reputation as the father of the
Constitution is unwarranted. Madison’s supposedly unparalleled
preparation for the Constitutional Convention and his purported authorship
of the Virginia plan are unsupported by the historical record. The ideas
Madison expressed in his surprisingly limited pre-Convention writings were
either widely shared or, where more peculiar to him, rejected by the
Convention. Moreover, virtually all of the actual drafting of the Constitution
was done by other delegates, principally James Wilson and Gouverneur
Morris. Second, we argue that Madison’s recorded thought in this critical
1787 period fails to establish him as a particularly keen or authoritative
interpreter of the Constitution. Focused myopically on the supposed
imperative of blocking bad state laws, Madison failed to diagnose the central
problem of federalism that was clear to many of his peers: the need to
empower the national government to regulate the people directly. Whereas
Madison clung to the idea of a national government controlling the states
through a national legislative veto, the Convention settled on a decidedly
non-Madisonian approach of bypassing the states by directly regulating the
people and controlling bad state laws indirectly through the combination of
federal supremacy and preemption. We conclude by suggesting that scholars
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pursue a fresh and more accurate assessment of Madison and his
constitutional legacy, particularly with respect to slavery.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional law has a James Madison problem. Among historians and
constitutional scholars, Madison is the most revered “Founding Father.” His
glowing reputation, despite a few dents and scratches, still gleams in the sun.
Prominent authors continue to publish repetitive, hagiographical
characterizations of him that garner attention and mainstream press royalties.
By contrast, critical accounts of Madison continually fail to penetrate the
remarkable mythology that has been built around him. Madison thus presents
a challenge for American history and constitutional scholarship. His mythic
reputation as the main protagonist in the framing and ratification of the
Constitution and his status as the premier authority on constitutional
interpretation are serious distortions of historical fact, yet they continue to
flourish in spite of their tenuous foundations. Moreover, scholars and judges
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persist in the belief that the Constitution is a “Madisonian” document.1 All
of these unjustified narratives unduly block our view of alternative Federalist
understandings of the Constitution, the theme this Symposium is devoted to
exploring.2
According to the received wisdom, Madison was both the single most
important actor in the creation of the Constitution—“the father of the
Constitution”—and its most authoritative theorist and interpreter.3 These
twin elements of Madison’s reputation are unwarranted, but to date they have
successfully resisted efforts to correct them. If anything, Madison’s
influence is increasing, thanks to the growing influence of conservative
originalists in American law and society, who find many of Madison’s views
congenial to their constitutional politics. Seeking to fight fire with fire,
liberals likewise often comb Madison’s writings for choice quotes and
insights that can be strategically used in judicial opinions, briefs, law review
articles, and newspaper op-eds. The majority and dissent in last term’s
decision in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,4 for
instance, read like a sort of rap battle of dueling Madison quotations, and
many other cases and academic debates do the same.5
What is so troubling about the enduring myths about Madison is that the
facts that undermine them are all well known, or at least should be by now.
The prodigious paper trail that Madison and other founders left behind and
1. See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Reps., 506 F.3d 584, 601–02 (7th Cir.
2007) (Wood, J., dissenting) (describing judicial review as a “Madisonian idea”); Pharm.
Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 87 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Madisonian Influences
on Allocation of Legislative Power in the American Legal System.”); GEORGE THOMAS, THE
MADISONIAN CONSTITUTION (2008); Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1998) (describing “our
Madisonian constitutional regime”); Keith Werhan, Popular Constitutionalism, Ancient and
Modern, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 65, 70 (2012) (referencing “the Madisonian Constitution that
we have inherited from the founders”); see also Jack M. Rakove, The Real Motives Behind
the Constitution: The Endless Quest, 48 REV. AM. HIST. 216, 217 (2020) (identifying the
“prevailing belief that the United States still inhabits a ‘Madisonian constitution’”).
2. Cf. MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 7 (2003) (observing that “our
knowledge of the Federalists, apart from Madison, is surprisingly limited”).
3. Rakove, supra note 1, at 217 (“In nearly every conventional story of the adoption of
the Constitution, Madison still stands primus inter pares.”). See generally DOUGLASS ADAIR,
FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS (Trevor Colborn ed., 1974); LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED
FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC (1995);
IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1800 (1950); MAX
FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); MICHAEL J.
KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2016);
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1996).
4. 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
5. Compare id. at 2197 (Roberts, C.J.) (“As Madison explained, ‘[I]f any power
whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling
those who execute the laws.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1789)
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834))), with id. at 2227 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“To the contrary, Madison
explained, the drafters of the Constitution . . . opted against keeping the branches of
government ‘absolutely separate and distinct.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 325
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961))).
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the best scholarship on the creation of the Constitution tell us all we need to
know to “right-size” him. Despite this, commentators continue to lionize
Madison, exaggerating his contributions to the founding, drawing every
possible inference from ambiguous or missing evidence in his favor, and
consistently ignoring or explaining away important counterevidence.
To a large extent, the primary academic debate about Madison has
centered on a single question that takes for granted the received wisdom
about his unrivaled contributions to the founding. To many, Madison’s
public career can be divided into two distinct periods, which appear difficult
to reconcile: throughout the 1780s, and in particular from 1787 to 1789, he
was a staunch nationalist who sought to protect and expand the powers of the
federal government, whereas from the early 1790s onward, he became a
vigorous Jeffersonian proponent of strict construction and states’ rights.
What happened and why did he change course? But to others, Madison was
in fact consistent throughout. This is the so-called “James Madison Problem”
to which scholars have devoted much attention in recent years.6 Crucially,
all the participants in that debate agree that we can learn most of what we
need to know about the original Constitution from viewing its formation and
early operation through Madison’s eyes.
The “other” Madison problem to which this Essay refers is the uncritical
acceptance of Madison’s privileged status in the first place. Particularly in
light of Mary Sarah Bilder’s pathbreaking scholarship on Madison and the
Constitutional Convention, we cannot accurately understand the
Constitution’s intellectual origins by perceiving them primarily through
Madison’s eyes,7 as many commentators have assumed.8 Madison was an
6. The problem was first given this name in 2006 by Gordon Wood when he titled a
chapter in his book, “Is There a ‘James Madison Problem?’” See GORDON S. WOOD,
REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS DIFFERENT 141–72 (2006). The
topic itself, however, is much older and arguably can be traced as far back as a 1792 letter
from Alexander Hamilton to Edward Carrington, in which Hamilton calls attention to
Madison’s shifting positions during the first years of the republic. See Letter from Alexander
Hamilton to Edward Carrington (May 26, 1792), in 11 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
426–45 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1966). For a representative sample of recent
scholarship on the “Madison Problem” as it is conventionally understood, see, for example,
JEREMY D. BAILEY, JAMES MADISON AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERFECTION (2015); BANNING,
supra note 3; JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES
OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (1999); Jeff Broadwater, James Madison and the Constitution:
Reassessing the “Madison Problem,” 123 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 202 (2015); Alan
Gibson, The Madisonian Madison and the Question of Consistency: The Significant
Challenge of Recent Research, 64 REV. POL. 311 (2002); Kevin R. Gutzman, A Troublesome
Legacy: James Madison and “The Principles of ‘98,” 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 589 (1995);
Peter S. Onuf, The “Madison Problem” Revisited, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 515 (2010).
7. See generally MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND:
REVISING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015); Mary Sarah Bilder, How Bad Were the Official
Records of the Federal Convention, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1620 (2012); Mary Sarah Bilder,
James Madison, Law Student and Demi-lawyer, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 389 (2010).
8. See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 3, at 2 (explaining that “it is Madison on whom we
unavoidably depend to comprehend” the “intellectual foundations” of the Constitution and
that “[i]f we have misinterpreted his conduct or mistaken his ideas, we have misunderstood
the Founding”); RAKOVE, supra note 3, at xvi (“Madison was the crucial actor in every phase
of the reform movement that led to the adoption of the Constitution . . . . We simply cannot
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important founding-era figure, to be sure, but he was not the “father of the
Constitution,” the “indispensable man,” or the key actor in the making of the
Constitution. Nor was he a uniquely privileged interpreter of the
Constitution, with special insight into its meaning that even his most
significant contemporaries lacked. Some of his constitutional ideas were
intelligent and penetrating, but many others were half-baked, opportunistic,
or just plain mistaken, and they have been rightly rejected by the verdicts of
history and legal doctrine.9
A comprehensive reassessment of Madison would require confronting at
least two related narratives about him: the historian’s Madison and the
lawyer’s Madison. The former conceives of Madison as “[t]he major
architect of the Constitution,”10 while the latter views him as a uniquely
privileged constitutional theorist, whose unparalleled authority entitles his
interpretations of the Constitution to special weight and consideration.11
Although this Essay does not purport to be comprehensive, it addresses
both of these conventional narratives, focusing mainly on Madison’s preConvention writings, Convention speeches, and theory of the “extended
republic” that he ultimately expressed in Federalist 10. We argue that a
careful review of these writings—together with the received wisdom that
views these writings as foundational—yields two important conclusions.
First, Madison’s reputation as father of the Constitution is largely a
historiographical artifact that is often simply assumed—and there are
compelling reasons to doubt the accuracy of this label. Second, Madison’s
solution to the problem of federalism—the primary theoretical challenge
confronting the Framers—was inadequate and diverged sharply from the
solution actually produced by the Convention. Given these inadequacies, the
understand how or why the Constitution took the form it did unless we make sense of
Madison.”).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (rejecting Madison’s interpretation
of the spending power); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (rejecting
Madison’s theory of implied powers and conclusion about the constitutionality of the bank).
Madison’s assertion in the 1798 Virginia Resolution that states had the right and duty “to
interpose for arresting the progress of” federal laws that were a “deliberate, palpable, and
dangerous exercise” of powers “not granted” by the Constitution contributed to a
constitutional counterculture of radical states’ rights, nullification, and arguably even
secession. It has been rejected by the verdict of history. See generally Kentucky Resolutions
(Nov. 10, 1798), reprinted in 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 158 (3d ed. 2008); Virginia Resolutions
(Dec. 21, 1798), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL
HISTORY, supra, at 162; see also STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, AGE OF FEDERALISM
700–01, 719–20 (1993); MARK E. NEELEY, LINCOLN AND THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATION:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 5–8 (2011).
10. WOOD, supra note 6, at 143.
11. See, e.g., NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 24–25 (2019) (describing
Madison as “the Father of the Constitution,” whose portrait he keeps in his chambers as a
reminder of his obligation to be faithful to “the original Constitution”). A third narrative is
that of the political scientists, who see Madison as anticipating key theoretical tenets of
modern American democracy. See, e.g., ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY
(1956); MARTIN DIAMOND, AS FAR AS REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES WILL ADMIT (William A.
Schambra ed., 1992). Although we do not focus on this third narrative here, we address
elements of it in Part II. See generally Part II.
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claim that Madison was the chief architect or even an especially perceptive
theorist of the Constitution seems untenable.
If this is correct, then Madison’s reputation as our leading constitutional
theorist must stand or fall on his activities after 1787. That remarkable career
includes many writings and events that figure prominently in early American
history, including his other Federalist essays, his defense of the Constitution
at the Virginia ratifying convention, his leadership in the First Congress, his
partisan battles of the 1790s, his presidency, and his extensive
correspondence about the Constitution during his retirement from 1817 until
his death in 1836. Through these latter activities, Madison undoubtedly
made a significant mark on postratification constitutional development and
interpretation. We believe that both the quality of these ideas and the depth
of their influence are also somewhat exaggerated and likewise fail to justify
Madison’s mythic reputation.12 But we do not take up these broader topics
here. Instead, we leave a more comprehensive assessment of Madison’s
successes as a politician and his overall legacy for another occasion. Here,
we focus on the period between the spring and fall of 1787, when Madison
is widely credited with articulating the ideas that shaped the crafting of the
Constitution. Although for our purposes, Madison’s contributions to The
Federalist are later developments that should be treated separately, we
extend our inquiry to Federalist 10 because scholars traditionally believe that
the ideas formulated there were an integral part of Madison’s thinking before
and during the Convention. Our primary aim is to open up a new
conversation about Madison by arguing that his contributions during this
critical period fail to justify his reputation as the Constitution’s father and
leading theorist.
I. NOT YOUR CONSTITUTION’S FATHER
Madison’s reputation as the “father of the Constitution” has never been
justified by any recognized standards of modern historical scholarship.
Instead, it appears to be largely an ongoing historiographical artifact.
According to Douglass Adair, this honorific title was first given to Madison

12. For some recent studies that complicate the received wisdom on Madison and have
informed our own thinking on these topics, see BILDER, supra note 7; JONATHAN GIENAPP,
THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018);
Alison L. LaCroix, The Authority for Federalism: Madison’s Negative and the Origins of
Federal Ideology, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 451 (2010); Farah Peterson, Expounding the
Constitution, 130 YALE L.J. 2 (2020); Richard Primus, The Essential Characteristic:
Enumerated Powers and the Bank of the United States, 117 MICH. L. REV. 415 (2018).
Madison’s role in proposing constitutional amendments and guiding them through the First
Congress calls out for separate treatment in this context but requires more attention than we
can provide here. For valuable discussions of this topic, see, for example, SAUL CORNELL,
THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA,
1788–1828, at 157–71 (1999); KLARMAN, supra note 3, at 546–95; Kenneth R. Bowling, “A
Tub to the Whale”: The Founding Fathers and Adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J.
EARLY REPUBLIC 228 (1988); Scott D. Gerber, Roger Sherman and the Bill of Rights, 28
POLITY 521 (1996).
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by former president John Quincy Adams in 1836,13 but a study of early
American newspapers reveals that the term was frequently applied to
Madison before then, often for partisan reasons.14 The paternity claim was
repeated throughout the nineteenth century,15 and it gained modern currency
due to its prominent endorsement by two of the leading historians of the
Convention at the dawn of the twentieth century, Max Farrand and Charles
Beard. Farrand, whose prodigious effort in curating the records of the
Convention gave his verdict special scholarly weight, famously called
Madison “the leading spirit” and “master-builder” of the Constitution.16
Beard referred to Madison as “the father of the Constitution” in the course of
linking his own economic interpretation of the Constitution to Madison’s
ideas in Federalist 10.17 In 1950, Irving Brant made the paternity label even
more popular when he affixed it to the third volume of his six-volume
biography of Madison.18 More recently, Douglass Adair, Lance Banning,
Jack Rakove, Gordon Wood, and other commentators have continued to use
this phrase to describe what they take to be Madison’s unrivaled
contributions to the founding. As we shall explain, however, none of these
scholars has justified this label, and many of them treat Madison in ways that
can only be characterized as hagiographical.
In this part, we argue that Madison’s reputation as the father of the
Constitution is unsupported by the available evidence. We begin by calling
attention to some notable filiopietistic tendencies that still pervade modern
historical scholarship on Madison. We then turn to a close analysis of the
unfounded paternity claim itself, identifying its main components and
arguing that they do not justify affixing this label to Madison.
A. The Historians’ Madison Myth
Contemporary historians conceive of their discipline as a serious enterprise
that no longer indulges in the kind of distorting hagiography one finds so
often in earlier periods of historical writing. Much of the leading modern
scholarship on Madison relaxes that necessary methodological rigor.
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, historians repeatedly made
13. See JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, AN EULOGY ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF JAMES
MADISON 84 (Boston, John H. Eastburn 1836) (referring to Madison as “the father of the
Constitution of the United States”). See generally Douglass Adair, The Tenth Federalist
Revisited, 8 WM. & MARY Q. 48, 51 (1951).
14. See, e.g., From the Richmond Whig to the People of Virginia, AM. MERCURY
(Hartford), Nov. 6, 1827 (referring to Madison as the “Father of the Constitution”); see also
Extracts from Mr. Clay’s Speech, NEW-BEDFORD MERCURY, May 16, 1834 (same); Mr.
Niles—and the Bank of the U.S., RICH. ENQUIRER, July 22, 1831, at 2 (same); Old Times,
INDEPENDENCE (Poughkeepsie), Feb. 8, 1832 (same).
15. See, e.g., JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1783–1789, at 244
(Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1897); WILLIAM CABELL RIVES, HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF JAMES MADISON vi (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1866) (describing the history of
Madison’s public life as “necessarily a history of the Constitution of the United States”).
16. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 196.
17. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 14 (1913).
18. BRANT, supra note 3.
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extravagant claims about Madison and his influence on the Constitution that
have profoundly influenced constitutional scholarship to this day. Yet these
claims cannot withstand scrutiny. This pattern owes a great deal to Max
Farrand, Charles Beard, and Douglass Adair, three scholars who played an
outsize role in shaping the received wisdom about Madison.
1. Max Farrand
Max Farrand published the first three volumes of his influential collection
of the records of the federal Convention in 1911. Two years later, he
published a short book on the drafting of the Constitution.19 In its final
chapter, Farrand assessed the relative contributions of the Framers and gave
Madison the unequivocal top billing:
In the achievement of [the Convention’s] task James Madison had been
unquestionably the leading spirit. It might be said that he was the masterbuilder of the constitution. This is not an over-valuation of his services
derived from his own account of the proceedings in convention, for
Madison laid no undue emphasis upon the part he himself played; in fact,
he understated it. Nor is it intended to belittle the invaluable services of
many other delegates. But when one studies the contemporary conditions,
and tries to discover how well the men of that time grasped the situation;
and when one goes farther and, in the light of our subsequent knowledge,
seeks to learn how wise were the remedies they proposed,—Madison stands
pre-eminent.20

Given how little of the actual drafting of the Constitution Madison did and
the relative contributions of other delegates, such as Gouverneur Morris,
Edmund Randolph, John Rutledge, and James Wilson, these assertions are
far from “unquestionabl[e]” and should have required considerable
support.21 Farrand proffered no evidence for these assertions, however,
which apparently the reader is meant to accept on Farrand’s say-so, based on
his unrivaled familiarity with the documentary records.
The distorted nature of Farrand’s discussion becomes clear when one
examines his descriptions of these and other important Framers. Farrand
minimizes their contributions by describing them as “Madison and his
supporters.”22 For example, George Washington’s primary significance at
the Convention, according to Farrand, was that his “support was given to
Madison.”23 James Wilson “was Madison’s ablest supporter” even though
he was “[i]n some respects . . . Madison’s intellectual superior,” because
Wilson “was not as adaptable and not as practical” as Madison.24 This claim
seems at odds with the fact that Madison’s dogged insistence on a federal

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

FARRAND, supra note 3.
Id. at 196.
See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
FARRAND, supra note 3, at 200.
Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
Id. at 197–98 (emphasis added).
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negative of state laws “in all cases whatsoever” was highly impractical;25
likewise, his steadfast refusal to compromise on proportional representation
in the Senate was hardly “adaptable.” Moreover, it was Wilson who played
the leading role in writing the first complete draft of the Constitution for the
Committee of Detail. Significantly, the Convention passed over Madison for
that crucial committee assignment in favor of his fellow Virginian, Edmund
Randolph. (Indeed, the Convention did not appoint Madison to an important
committee until late August.)26 When we consider the fact that Wilson,
Randolph, Rutledge, and Morris had far greater influence than Madison on
the precise structure and content of Articles I, II, and III, along with their
responsibility for many of the Constitution’s most significant clauses and
features—including but not limited to the Vesting Clauses; the Necessary and
Proper Clause; the Supremacy Clause; the enumerated powers scheme of
Article I, Section 8; the limits on federal and state powers in Article I,
Sections 9 and 10; the Commander-in-Chief and Take Care Clauses of
Article II; the jurisdictional grants of Article III; and the Constitution’s allimportant Preamble—Farrand’s claim seems, not self-evident, but
counterintuitive.27
To offset his heavy reliance on Madison’s own paper trail, a more selfconscious scholar might have scrutinized his own potential availability bias
in assuming that Madison was the leading spirit and preeminent Framer of
the Constitution, taking care to distinguish Madison’s influence on the
historical records of the Convention from his influence on the drafting of the
Constitution itself. Despite his brief nod in this direction,28 Farrand did not
do so. Nevertheless, he wrote with a special authority about the framing of
the Constitution, since he had worked more closely with the documentary
records of the Convention than any other scholar at the time. As a result, his
account of the framing took on a special significance and set the dominant
pattern for many similar assessments that followed for the next century.
Farrand’s two most specific and memorable theses—that Madison was the
chief architect or master-builder of the Constitution and that Wilson was his
most able supporter and a close second—have been reproduced by countless

25. See infra notes 209–22 and accompanying text.
26. The procedure by which members of Convention committees were appointed remains
uncertain, and no delegate left any records clarifying this issue. Nonetheless, the most likely
answer appears to be that each state delegation chose its own member for the grand
“committees of eleven,” while the two five-member committees that did most of the actual
drafting of the Constitution—the Committee of Detail and the Committee of Style and
Arrangement—were chosen by ballot in which each member of the Convention voted. See
David O. Stewart, Who Picked the Committees at the Constitutional Convention?, J. AM.
REVOLUTION (Sept. 13, 2018), https://allthingsliberty.com/2018/09/who-picked-thecommittees-at-the-constitutional-convention [https://perma.cc/H8GR-L2YY].
27. See generally 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 129–89 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (Committee of Detail documents and
drafts, authored principally by Wilson, Randolph, and Rutledge); id. at 590–603 (Committee
of Style draft, authored principally by Morris).
28. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 196.
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commentators, sometimes nearly verbatim.29 What is perhaps most notable
is not these assessments themselves but the fact that no one who makes these
claims ever bothers to provide any argument or evidence for them. Indeed,
no such writer ever pauses to explain how claims like these could be justified
or even what it means to attribute the design of the Constitution primarily to
the work or thought of one man.30 Nonetheless, the claims are repeated,
generation after generation, until they become pure dogma. Everyone knows
that Madison was the most important man in Philadelphia. What more needs
to be said?
2. Charles Beard
Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States31 has been enormously influential on founding-era scholarship.
Many of his specific claims about the interests and motivations of the
founders have been discredited or called into question,32 but the broader
economic approach to constitutional history he advocated has largely
endured.33 One clear illustration of Beard’s recurring influence concerns his
interpretation of Madison. Beard was the first scholar to place Federalist 10
at the heart of American constitutional theory, a favored position it has
occupied ever since. “The inquiry which follows,” he explained in the first
chapter of his book, “is based upon the political science of James Madison,
the father of the Constitution and later President of the Union he had done so
much to create.”34 Beard then reproduced Madison’s famous remarks on
factions and their origin in “the various and unequal distribution of property”
in society, characterizing it as “a masterly statement” of the theory of class
conflict and economic analysis in politics.35
Before Beard, no historian had been so crass as to list, one by one, the
delegates to the Convention and their respective holdings of real estate, scrip,
slaves, and other assets in order to call into question the purity of their
motives. Beard did so in minute detail in the infamous chapter that more than
29. See, e.g., RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 40 (2009); CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 247–48
(1966); Adrienne Koch, Introduction to JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at vii, xi–xii (Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1840).
30. See William Ewald, James Wilson and the American Founding, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 6 (2019) (describing how Oxford University’s new “Project Quill” has graphically
represented the extraordinary complexity of the Federal Convention, including approximately
2500 decision points and concluding on that basis that the question “Who is the Father of the
Constitution?” is misconceived); accord Sanford Levinson, The United States and Political
Dysfunction: “What Are Elections For?,” 61 DRAKE L. REV. 959, 967 (2012) (questioning
the “great man theory” of the founding on analogous grounds).
31. See BEARD, supra note 17.
32. See generally ROBERT E. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF “AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION” (1956);
FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1958).
33. See, e.g., WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2007); KLARMAN, supra note 3.
34. BEARD, supra note 17, at 14.
35. Id. at 15 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)).
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anything else earned him his subversive, bad-boy reputation.36 Among other
entries in this chapter, Beard devotes two and a half pages to detailing George
Washington’s vast investments in real estate, stocks, and bonds; three pages
to outlining Robert Morris’s extensive mercantile interests; four pages to
describing Elbridge Gerry’s large holdings in public securities; and fourteen
pages to explaining how Alexander Hamilton—“the colossal genius of the
new system”—managed to devise a financial program that appealed to
various economic interests and consolidated their support for the new
government.37 And Madison? Alone among the delegates, Beard credits him
with disinterested public service. In contrast to his more self-interested
colleagues, Beard confidently reports, Madison’s “inclinations were all
toward politics,” so he was “able later to take a more disinterested view of
the funding system proposed by Hamilton.”38
Significantly, Beard was an early representative of what has become the
dominant political science view of Federalist 10, resting on an interest group
theory of politics.39 In general, his work suggests that anyone wishing to
characterize the Constitution as an antimajoritarian, property-protecting
instrument has a major stake in playing up Madison’s influence. Yet Beard
managed to exempt Madison himself from this interest group theory.
Madison is thus conceived by Beard as smart enough to understand the true
nature of the Constitution, yet virtuous enough to stand above the fray. Yet
the most basic sociological fact about Madison, that he was one of the most
successful politicians of the founding era, who represented the largest,
wealthiest, and biggest slaveholding state in the nation—a state with much
to lose from Hamilton’s financial program and the other measures Madison
fought tooth and nail in the First Congress—somehow escapes Beard’s
critical attention. And Beard set the pattern for how Madison would be
perceived by progressive historians during the first half of the twentieth
century and beyond: brilliant, virtuous, and generally beyond reproach.40
36. Id. at 73–151.
37. See id. at 95–99 (Gerry); 100–14 (Hamilton); 133–36 (Morris); 144–46 (Washington).
38. Id. at 125. Beard’s favorable treatment of Madison was repeated two years later in his
next book. See CHARLES A. BEARD, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY: HOW
HAMILTON’S MERCHANT CLASS LOST OUT TO THE AGRARIAN SOUTH 142 (1915) (“Madison,
who did not hold any securities himself and was able to take a dispassionate view of the merits
of several claims against the United States.”).
39. For an influential history of this development, see Paul F. Bourke, The Pluralist
Reading of James Madison’s Tenth Federalist, 9 PERSPS. AM. HIST. 271 (1975). As Bourke
notes, along with Harold Laski, Walter Lippman, and others, Beard continued to contribute to
this interpretation of Madison in his later publications. See id. at 272 n.2 (citing CHARLES
BEARD, THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF POLITICS (1922)).
40. Cf. Rakove, supra note 1, at 217 (“[A]t least since Charles Beard first emphasized
Federalist 10 . . . , Madison has been our preeminent [constitutional] authority.”). Not all
scholars in this era adulated Madison to this extent. Charles Warren, for example, considered
Madison but one of the “[t]en men [who] stand out as chiefly responsible for the form which
the Constitution finally took—Madison, Randolph, Franklin, Wilson, Gouverneur Morris,
King, Rutledge, Charles Pinckney, Ellsworth, and Sherman.” CHARLES WARREN, THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 57 (1928). Moreover, if there was a first among equals, it was
not Madison but Washington. “Of all the delegates, there was one [Washington] whose
presence in the Convention was absolutely essential to its success, and without whose
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3. Douglass Adair
A major development in the unfolding of Madison’s reputation as the
father of the Constitution was the mid-twentieth-century surge of interest in
Federalist 10. This process began with Beard but took off with the work of
Douglass Adair, who holds a special place among early American historians
for his influential PhD dissertation,41 his fruitful intellectual genealogy of the
antecedents to—and authorship of—important Federalist essays,42 and his
service as editor of the prestigious William & Mary Quarterly during its
renaissance from 1944 to 1955. Adair endorsed Beard’s assessment of the
centrality of Federalist 10 to the founding, while seeking to rescue Madison’s
essay from what he took to be Beard’s crude “Marxian” interpretation of it
as an analysis of class struggle by uncovering the essay’s intellectual
origins.43 Adair’s principal argument in this context was to link Federalist
10 to David Hume’s essay on the “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” in
which Adair found “the germ for Madison’s theory of the extended
republic.”44 Embellishing an outline first sketched by Madison himself,45
approval, the work of the Convention would have failed of acceptance by the American
people.” Id. at 61. Despite all this, Warren still felt it necessary to make a somewhat
incongruous obeisance to Madison’s reputation: “No one who reads Madison’s letters and his
speeches in the debates will wonder that he has been termed, without dissent, the ‘Father of
the Constitution.’” Id. at 57.
41. See DOUGLASS G. ADAIR, THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY:
REPUBLICANISM, THE CLASS STRUGGLE, AND THE VIRTUOUS FARMER (Mark E. Yellin ed.,
2000). In his introduction to this posthumously published volume, editor Mark Yellin reports
that Adair’s dissertation, which was completed at Yale in 1943, “is one of the most influential
dissertations” ever written on the founding, “with a list of borrowers that resembled ‘a who’s
who in early American history.’” Mark E. Yellin, Introduction to THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY: REPUBLICANISM, THE CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE VIRTUOUS
FARMER, supra, at xiii, xiii (quoting Trevor Colbourn, Introduction to FAME AND THE
FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS BY DOUGLASS ADAIR xi, xv (Trevor Colbourn ed., Liberty Fund
1998) (1974)).
42. See generally Douglass Adair, “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science”: David
Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, 20 HUNTINGTON LIB. Q. 343 (1957);
Douglass Adair, The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers (pt. 2), 1 WM. & MARY Q.
235 (1944); Adair, supra note 13.
43. Adair, supra note 13, at 48–49, 60.
44. ADAIR, supra note 3, at 93. In a passage that anticipates Madison’s theory of the
extended republic in Federalist 10 in several respects, Hume wrote:
Though it is more difficult to form a republican government in an extensive country
than in a city; there is more facility, when once it is formed, of preserving it steady
and uniform, without tumult and faction. . . . In a large government, which is
modelled with masterly skill, there is compass and room enough to refine the
democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or
first concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magistrates, who direct all the
movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very
difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measures
against the public interest.
DAVID HUME, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND
LITERARY 512, 527–28 (Eugene F. Miller ed., rev. ed. 1985) (1777).
45. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, A Sketch Never Finished nor Applied, reprinted in NOTES
OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 29, at 3, 16 (crediting his own
April 8, 1787, letter to Randolph as “the earliest” outline “of a Constitutional Gov’t for the
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Adair connected the dots between these ideas in Federalist 10 and Madison’s
other writings, including “Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies,”46
“Vices of the Political System of the United States,”47 his pre-Convention
letters to Jefferson, Randolph, and Washington,48 and Federalist 41.49
Finally, Adair also highlighted the purported connections between all these
writings and the Virginia Plan, thereby forging the links of interrelated ideas
that, he was convinced, sparked the formation of the Constitution.50
For Adair, the upshot of these discoveries was that Madison was a
constitutional theorist of the first rank whose “abstract speculative thought
played a significant role in the writing and ratification of the United States
Constitution.”51 This bold thesis helps to explain the soaring rhetoric Adair
used to describe Madison. Adair lionized him as a “philosopher-statesman”
whose “greatest glory” was that “he transcended the impossible by inventing
a completely new type of federal state, which while solidly resting on
majority rule at the same time provided adequate safeguards for the rights of
minority groups.”52 According to Adair, Madison “evolved an original
theory of republican federalism differing completely from the principles of
any of the historic confederations.”53 Even before the delegates gathered in
Philadelphia, “he had elaborated his novel scheme” in his memoranda and
correspondence, and he had begun drawing up “the blueprint of a
governmental structure which would institutionalize his theory.”54 Elevating
Madison’s reputation even further, Adair concluded:
It was a brilliant intellectual achievement which won for the thirty-fiveyear-old Madison the right to be called the philosopher of the American
Constitution. His theory, embodied in the structure of the American Union,
was to prove also the greatest triumph in practical application of the
Enlightenment’s ideal of scientific political research.55

For good measure, Adair described Madison’s pre-Convention preparation
“as probably the most fruitful piece of scholarly research ever carried out by
an American.”56 The accolades here are truly breathtaking but merely
indicative of the extraordinary reputation Madison had earned in Adair’s

Union . . . to be sanctioned by the people of the States, acting in their original and sovereign
character” and proceeding to discuss the fate of the federal negative Madison proposed to
Randolph in that letter).
46. JAMES MADISON, Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies, in 9 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 3 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975).
47. JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 9 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 46, at 345, 345.
48. See infra Part I.B.2.
49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
50. See ADAIR, supra note 3, at 190–94.
51. MADISON, supra note 45, at 49–50.
52. ADAIR, supra note 3, at 192.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 191.
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influential account, which came to dominate perceptions of Madison during
the postwar period.
B. The Unfounded Paternity Claim
Against this historiographical background, we turn now to the unfounded
paternity claim itself. The idea that Madison deserves to be characterized as
the father or main architect of the Constitution has never been laid out
methodically. Madison’s admirers have been surprisingly inattentive to this
elementary step. Instead, they typically assert one or two elements of the
claim and then rely on the great myth itself to do most of the analytical heavy
lifting. Compiling the various accounts in the literature, we find that the
unfounded paternity claim consists of four main components.
(1) Madison came to the Convention better prepared than any other
delegate.
(2) Madison arrived at the Convention with a set of novel ideas about
the structure of government that were not held by the other delegates. He
advocated them and persuaded his fellow delegates to adopt them.
(3) Madison was the primary author of the Virginia Plan and used that
plan to seize control of the Convention. His plan served as the working
model for the final document, hence it should be credited as the basis or
blueprint of the Constitution.
(4) Madison’s ideas and agenda are reflected in the final text, structure,
and institutional design of the Constitution more than those of any other
delegate.
All of these claims have been made, in one way or another, by highly
respected scholars.57 They are all unproven and, absent major qualifications,
probably false. Significantly, each of these claims is comparative: it requires
comparing Madison’s preparation, ideas, arguments, or contributions to the
Constitution with those of other Convention delegates.58 Nevertheless, none
of the scholars who make these claims on behalf of Madison have provided,
let alone evaluated, any comparative evidence in support of them. On closer
scrutiny, the claims fall apart, either for lack of evidence or under the weight
of contrary evidence.
1. Madison’s Pre-Convention Preparation
Many historians appear deeply attached to the idea that Madison was the
best prepared delegate to the Convention. The editors of The Papers of
James Madison make this assertion in characteristically unqualified terms:
No other delegate came to that historic meeting so well prepared as JM,
ready to confront the complex problems of establishing an energetic
national government based on republican principles. His many years of
public service on both the state and continental level had provided JM with
an unrivaled knowledge of American affairs. Yet what distinguished JM
57. See generally infra Parts I.B.1–4.
58. See generally infra Parts I.B.1–4.
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from his fellow delegates, apart from his superior intellectual gifts, was not
so much his firsthand experience in public life—extensive though it was—
as his diligent effort to apply to that experience a scholarly study of the
principles of government.59

The essential claim of this passage has been repeated by numerous scholars
over the years. Lance Banning, for instance, affirms that “Madison had come
to Philadelphia the best prepared of all who gathered for the Federal
Convention.”60 Jeff Broadwater concurs: “Madison reached Philadelphia on
May 5, the best prepared of all the delegates . . . .”61 So does Adrienne Koch,
who confidently relates that Madison “outdistanced all the other delegates by
his initial preparation” for the Convention.62 On its face, these claims
compare Madison’s preparation to that of the other delegates. Yet none of
these commentators actually engages in such a comparison—that is, none of
them points to, let alone weighs, any evidence or information concerning the
pre-Convention preparation of any other delegate.63
What scholars have in mind when they highlight Madison’s unrivaled
preparation for the Convention consists primarily of two unfinished
memoranda and three short letters. In addition, they occasionally refer to
Madison’s seven years in the Confederation Congress and the Virginia
legislature from 1780 to 1787—and sometimes even to his undergraduate
training at Princeton and his youthful service on the Virginia Council of State
and at the Fifth Virginia Convention.64 We will return below to a close
analysis of Madison’s pre-Convention writings. Before doing so, however,
it seems worthwhile to pause and consider why the claim that Madison was
the “best prepared” member of the Convention seems implausible on its face
and at odds with any sober historical assessment of the relevant experiences
of the men who gathered in Philadelphia that summer to create a new form
of government.
Consider briefly some examples of other delegates whose “many years of
public service on both the state and continental level”65 had prepared them
for the essential business of the Convention. More than twice as old as
Madison, Benjamin Franklin brought decades of public service to the
Convention, including serving as a member and Speaker of the Pennsylvania
legislature; a delegate to the 1754 Albany Congress and chief draftsman of
the Albany Plan of Union; a colonial agent to the Crown on behalf of
Pennsylvania and several other colonies; a delegate to the Continental
59. MADISON, supra note 47, at 345, 345 (editorial note to Vices of the Political System of
the United States).
60. BANNING, supra note 3, at 115.
61. JEFF BROADWATER, JAMES MADISON: A SON OF VIRGINIA AND A FOUNDER OF THE
NATION 44 (2012).
62. Koch, supra note 29, at xiii.
63. Perhaps aware of this problem, Jack Rakove more cautiously credits Madison only
with making “critical preparations” aimed at “shaping the agenda for the convention.” JACK
N. RAKOVE, A POLITICIAN THINKING: THE CREATIVE MIND OF JAMES MADISON 44 (2017).
64. See, e.g., MADISON, supra note 47 (editorial note to Vices of the Political System of
the United States).
65. Id.
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Congress and author of an early draft of the Articles of Confederation; the
first postmaster general of the United States; commissioner and minster to
France; and president of Pennsylvania.66 Along with John Adams and John
Jay, Franklin negotiated the 1783 Treaty of Paris that ended the
Revolutionary War on behalf of the United States.67
From 1775 to 1783, George Washington led the entire Continental Army
in its war against the British Empire. In that capacity, Washington directly
or indirectly commanded twenty-three of the forty men who signed the
Constitution, all of whom had served in uniform during the Revolutionary
War.68 In addition to his military experience (which included serving as a
British officer in the French and Indian War), Washington was a seasoned
legislator. He served in the Virginia House of Burgesses from 1758 to 1765,
where he led the opposition in Virginia to the Stamp Act of 1765,69 the
Declaratory Act of 1766,70 and the Townshend Acts of 1767,71 and later
served in the Continental Congress from 1774 to 1775.72
Three decades older than Madison, Roger Sherman brought a wealth of
legislative, executive, judicial, and practical experience to the Convention.
Among other activities, he had been a member of the Connecticut House of
Representatives, the mayor of New Haven, a justice of the Connecticut
Superior Court, a member of the Governor’s Council of the Connecticut
General Assembly, and a delegate to the Continental Congress.73 Sherman
helped frame and signed the 1774 Articles of Association, the Declaration of
Independence, and the Articles of Confederation.74
Nearly twenty years older than Madison, John Dickinson also came to the
Convention well prepared for the business of framing a new constitution. A
lawyer by training who spent four years studying at Middle Temple,
Dickinson attended the 1765 Stamp Act Congress, led American opposition
to the Townshend Acts, published the renowned Letters from a Farmer in
Pennsylvania, served as a delegate to the Continental Congress, drafted the
Articles of Confederation, fought in the Revolutionary War, and served as
the president of not one, but two, of the thirteen states: Pennsylvania and
Delaware.75
66. See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (2002).
67. Id.
68. See ROBERT K. WRIGHT JR. & MORRIS J. MACGREGOR JR., SOLDIER-STATESMEN OF
THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1987). This figure includes Convention Secretary William Jackson.
69. 5 Geo. 3 c. 12 (Eng.).
70. 6 Geo. 3 c. 12 (Eng.).
71. 7 Geo. 3 c. 41 (Eng.).
72. For biographies of Washington, see, for example, RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A
LIFE (2010); JOSEPH J. ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY: GEORGE WASHINGTON (2005); DAVID O.
STEWART, GEORGE WASHINGTON: THE POLITICAL RISE OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING FATHER
(2021).
73. See generally MARK DAVID HALL, ROGER SHERMAN AND THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2013).
74. Id.
75. See JANE E. CALVERT, QUAKER CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
JOHN DICKINSON 14–17 (2009); 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. POLITICAL HISTORY 110–14
(Andrew W. Robertson ed., 2010).
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Short biographies like these highlighting their relevant experiences could
be given for George Mason, John Rutledge, Robert Morris, James Wilson,
Gouverneur Morris, Edmund Randolph, and several other delegates with an
equal claim to being prepared as well as, if not better than, Madison for the
Convention. Why is it useful to recall these facts here? Because they should
cause us to view the common refrain that Madison was the “best prepared”
delegate to the Convention with considerable skepticism. Simply because
we lack comparably well-preserved records of what other delegates read and
wrote before the Convention, we should not infer that they were less prepared
than Madison on this score. Certainly, the actions by some of the delegates
at or near the start of the proceedings suggest that they came well prepared
indeed.76
Furthermore, it is crucial to recognize that while Madison was a rising star
in 1787, he was still relatively young and inexperienced in comparison with
many of the other delegates. In terms of how they viewed each other, he was
not one of the most imposing or influential men at the Convention. He was
not one of the “demigods” to whom Jefferson referred;77 indeed, he was not
even one of the most prominent Virginians, plausibly ranking below several
other deputies from his native state in this respect. The uncritical repetition
of the claim that Madison was the best prepared delegate and intellectual
leader of the Convention obscures all of these facts, propping up the Madison
myth instead of placing his actual contributions to the framing of the
Constitution in their genuine historical context.
2. Madison’s Pre-Convention Ideas
Conventional scholarship on the founding generally perpetuates Farrand’s
unsupported assertion that “Madison’s ideas were the predominating factor
in the framing of the constitution.”78 What were those ideas? Madison
scholars generally agree that the bulk of Madison’s pre-Convention thinking
about the Constitution is distilled in five documents: first, his “Notes on
Ancient and Modern Confederacies,”79 composed in the spring of 1786; next,
his three letters to Jefferson, Randolph, and Washington,80 written on March
19, April 8, and April 16, 1787, respectively; and finally, his undated
memorandum on the “Vices of the Political System of the United States.”81

76. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 16 (indicating that Charles
Pinckney had prepared a draft plan of government before the Convention, which he presented
on May 29); id. at 65–69 (indicating that James Wilson came prepared to argue for a single
chief executive, who would be elected by the people for a relatively short term and eligible
for reelection, all of which he proposed on June 1).
77. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug. 30, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 66, 69 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955).
78. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 198.
79. See generally MADISON, supra note 46.
80. See infra notes 88–100 and accompanying text.
81. Banning creates the impression that Madison wrote voluminously and in great depth
in preparation for the Convention; one has to scour his endnotes to see that only these five
documents are cited. See BANNING, supra note 3, at 115–19. Rakove more forthrightly
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In light of the extraordinary accolades they have received—recall that Adair
called Madison’s two memoranda “the most fruitful piece[s] of scholarly
research ever carried out by an American”82—one might expect these
writings to be a deep and voluminous, and perhaps even forbidding, read.
They are not. More importantly, a close analysis of them reveals that they
cannot justify the claim that Madison was the father of the Constitution.
a. “Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies”
We begin with Madison’s “Notes on Ancient and Modern
Confederacies,”83 written shortly before the Annapolis Convention. Unlike,
say, Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia—a full-length book—
Madison’s “Notes” really are just notes—not even an essay. In fact, the
document reads like the notes of a graduate student from a seminar on
“Ancient and Modern Confederacies.” For each of five main confederacies,
Madison jots down a series of factual bullet points about their history and
organization, followed by a section stating the “vices” of each. As to the
Helvetic confederacy, for example, Madison concludes:
VICES of the Constitution
1. disparity in size of Cantons
2. different principles of Governmt. in difft. Cantons
3. intolerance in Religion
4. weakness of the Union. The Common bailages wch. served as a Cement,
sometimes become occasions of quarrels. Dictre. de Suisse.84

Like so many ambitious graduate school study outlines, the document was
unfinished.85 Had these notes been found in the papers of, say, Georgia
delegate Abraham Baldwin or New Jersey delegate Jonathan Dayton, it is
hard to imagine them generating much scholarly interest, let alone causing
historians to extol Baldwin’s or Dayton’s prodigious learning or preparation
for the Convention. More significantly, there is nothing in the “Notes on
Ancient and Modern Confederacies” showing any real effort by Madison to
connect whatever he learned from this study to the circumstances of the
United States. Rakove seems to recognize this, acknowledging that
“Madison came away from his reading frustrated with how little useful
information he had gained from this line of research.”86 Madison appears to
have used these notes in some of his Convention speeches and Federalist
essays, and his post-Convention letter to Jefferson indicates that the research
identifies four of these as the key documents, omitting the “Notes on Ancient and Modern
Confederacies.” See RAKOVE, supra note 63, at 45–46.
82. ADAIR, supra note 3, at 192.
83. MADISON, supra note 46, at 3.
84. Id. at 11.
85. The manuscript ends with the heading “Gryson Confederacy,” with no notes on that
one. Id. at 22. The editors remark: “JM’s notes end here. He apparently meant to add on to
them at a later time.” Id. at 24 n.34.
86. RAKOVE, supra note 63, at 8.
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convinced him that the primary vice of these confederacies was the absence
of a federal negative over the mischievous laws of the confederated states.87
Yet in light of the fanfare around these notes, what seems most striking about
them is how little impact they would ultimately have on the founding.
b. Letters to Jefferson, Randolph, and Washington
In his April 16 letter to Washington, Madison spelled out the crux of his
views on federalism in a mere sixty-five words:
Conceiving that an individual independence of the States is utterly
irreconcilable with their aggregate sovereignty; and that a consolidation of
the whole into one simple republic would be as inexpedient as it is
unattainable, I have sought for some middle ground, which may at once
support a due supremacy of the national authority, and not exclude the local
authorities wherever they can be subordinately useful.88

This quote is not an introduction to a longer passage but the entirety of it, and
calling this a “theory” of federalism would be quite an exaggeration.
Moreover, ample documentary evidence confirms that this “middle ground”
was a dominant idea of most of the delegates who attended the Convention.89
The whole point of the gathering was to create a new form of government
that would overcome the “individual independence of the States,” while
stopping short of a complete “consolidation” in which the States ceased to
exist altogether.90 That some compromise between these extremes would be
sought was a foregone conclusion that needed no spark from Madison.
What other important ideas can be gleaned from Madison’s preConvention letters to Jefferson, Randolph, and Washington? First, on the
scope of federal authority, Madison proposed that “the national Government
should be armed with positive and compleat authority in all cases which
require uniformity; such as the regulation of trade, including the right of
taxing both exports & imports, the fixing the terms and forms of
naturalization &c &c.”91 Here, again, Madison was saying nothing remotely
unique or original: plenary authority over interstate and foreign commerce
had been proposed in Congress by John Witherspoon of New Jersey in 1781,
for example, and it was the core mission of the Annapolis Convention in
1786.92 By the spring of 1787, these ideas were completely familiar. Note,
87. See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 18–20, supra note 49 (James Madison); Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 46, at 205.
88. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 46, at 382, 383. For an almost identical passage, see Letter
from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 46, at 368, 369.
89. See infra Part II.A.
90. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 88, at 382.
91. Id. at 383.
92. See 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 110 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912) (Feb.
3, 1781) (recording a motion by John Witherspoon to vest Congress “with a right of
superintending the commercial regulations of every State . . . [and] with the exclusive right of
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too, that Madison failed to advocate here a direct power of taxation, but rather
folded the all-important taxing power into trade regulation—thus missing
one of the primary ideas that would be embodied in the new Constitution.
Second, Madison proposed a national government divided into three
departments, with supreme legislative, executive, and judicial powers,
including a bicameral legislature whose upper house would be less numerous
and sit for longer terms.93 These skeletal ideas were also in wide circulation
and, in fact, were reflected in almost every state constitution at the time.94 In
January 1787, for instance, Washington received letters from John Jay and
Henry Knox arguing for this exact structure of a tripartite national
government with a bicameral legislature, whose upper house would consist
of fewer, longer-tenured members.95 As to a national executive, Madison
admitted having “scarcely ventured as yet to form my own opinion either of
the manner in which it ought to be constituted or of the authorities with which
it ought to be cloathed.”96
Third, Madison argued that the new Constitution would have to be ratified
by the people themselves: “To give a new system its proper validity and
energy, a ratification must be obtained from the people, and not merely from
the ordinary authority of the Legislatures.”97 But he did not say much more
about this. Although many Madison scholars credit him with this idea, it too
appears to have been widely shared. For example, Jay’s January 1787 letter
to Washington argued that the state legislatures lacked authority to amend
the Constitution, and that “[n]o alterations in the Government should I think
be made, nor if attempted will easily take place, unless deducible from the
only Source of just authority—the People.”98 Knox, on a related note, argued
that the Convention should originate from “the people themselves” rather
than the state legislatures.99
Fourth, Madison advocated granting the national government the power to
use armed force against the states to guarantee compliance with federal law
and “expressly guarantying the tranquility of the States agst. internal as well

laying duties upon all imported articles”). Madison was serving in Congress when
Witherspoon made this motion and voted against it. See id. at 111 (showing that the motion
was defeated by a 5 to 4 vote, with Madison and the entire Virginia delegation voting “no”).
On the Annapolis Convention, see generally JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL
POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 368–80 (1979).
93. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 88, at 383–84.
94. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–
1787, at 125–255 (2d ed. 1998).
95. See Letter from John Jay to George Washington (Jan. 7, 1787), in 4 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 502 (W. W. Abbot ed., 1995); Letter from
Henry Knox to George Washington (Jan. 14, 1787), in 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES, supra, at 518.
96. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 88, at 385; cf. Letter
from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 46, at 369. These two letters contain nearly identical passages.
97. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 88, at 385.
98. Letter from John Jay to George Washington, supra note 95, at 504.
99. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington, supra note 95, at 521.
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as external dangers.”100 Madison had misgivings about armed coercion of
the states, however, and he quickly abandoned this notion at the Convention;
whereas his idea about protecting the states against “internal . . . dangers”
merely reflected the widespread concern about popular uprisings like Shays’s
Rebellion and, in the Southern states, slave revolts.101
Madison’s fifth point, and one of the two on which he dilated at greatest
length, was proportional representation in the Senate.102 Today, many of us
regret the malapportionment stemming from equal state voting power in the
Senate, and we are inclined to think that Madison was right (even though
Madison was probably more concerned to promote Virginia’s dominance in
Congress than with representativeness per se).
But proportional
representation in the Senate was hardly an idea unique to Madison103 and, in
any event, it failed. Madison can hardly be called the father of the
Constitution for an idea that not only was rejected but which would likely
have derailed the Convention had it not been compromised away (over
Madison’s vehement opposition).104
The idea contained in these letters that could truly be said to belong to
Madison in any meaningful way was the national legislative veto, or federal
negative.105 While Madison did not exactly invent the veto—he candidly
describes it “as heretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative”106—he was
undoubtedly the leading proponent of the idea at the Convention, along with
Charles Pinckney.107 The other delegates recognized that it was Madison’s
pet project. Wilson called it “novel,” and Gerry, attacking it, observed that
“[i]t has never been suggested or conceived among the people. No
speculative projector . . . has in any pamphlet or newspaper thrown out the
idea.”108
The federal negative bordered on an obsession for Madison. His three preConvention letters spent more effort advocating it than any other idea.109
And of all the vicissitudes of the Convention and the arguable shortcomings
of its final product, this was the one over which Madison expressed the
100. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 88, at 385.
101. For extensive histories of the 1786 uprising led by Daniel Shays and Luke Day along
with its constitutional implications, see, for example, SEAN CONDON, SHAYS’S REBELLION:
AUTHORITY AND DISTRESS IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (2015); LEONARD L. RICHARDS,
SHAYS’S REBELLION (2002); DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS’ REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN
AGRARIAN INSURRECTION (1984).
102. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 88, at 387.
103. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 188, 191 and accompanying text.
105. One might assume that Madison’s ideas about an extended republic should also be
included here, but this would be a mistake. As Bilder notes, while other elements of the
“Vices” manuscript can be found in his pre-Convention correspondence, the “extended
republic” idea does not appear in any of these letters. See BILDER, supra note 7, at 244, 335
n.3.
106. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 88, at 383.
107. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 164; 2 id. at 390. See generally BILDER,
supra note 7.
108. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 165–66.
109. See supra notes 87, 88 and accompanying text.
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greatest regret. Madison’s famous Convention postmortem in his October
24, 1787, letter to Jefferson contains a 2400-word disquisition on the federal
negative—Madison’s most developed statement of the idea anywhere.110
The primary takeaway from his study of confederacies was that “[t]he want
of” “the royal negative or some equivalent controul” “seems to have been
mortal to the antient Confederacies, and to be the disease of the modern.”111
Yet the Convention squarely rejected Madison’s theory, undercutting the
core element of his vision for how the Constitution should be designed.
c. “Vices of the Political System of the United States”
Madison’s most in-depth analysis of the problem of constitutional reform
before the Convention was his memorandum, “Vices of the Political System
of the United States.”112 Yet, contrary to its billing, though consistent with
its title, the “Vices” memorandum is neither a blueprint for a national
government nor a theory of federalism. While Madison’s contemporaries
were primarily concerned with the “imbecility” of the national government—
its inadequate powers to make and enforce legislation—Madison’s primary
focus was on state legislative excesses and deficiencies.
Madison listed twelve vices in total in this manuscript, which Bilder and
other scholars have tended to divide into three groups.113 The first through
the fourth vices emphasize the vicious character of state laws from an
interstate perspective—their adverse effects on other states or the governing
of the Confederation. These are: (1) “Failure of the States to comply with
the Constitutional requisitions,” (2) “Encroachments by the States on the
federal authority,” (3) “Violations of the law of nations and of treaties,” and
(4) “Trespasses of the States on the rights of each other.”114
While some scholars view the second group of vices as an analysis of
federalism, Madison in fact offers very little thinking here on the division of
state and national powers. The fifth vice continues to focus on state
malfeasance, blaming the states for “want of concert in matters where
common interest requires it.”115 Notably, in this brief discussion, Madison
does not conclude that the states’ lack of coordination on common objectives
should be transformed into a justification for affirmative national legislative
power. The sixth vice, “want of Guaranty to the States of their Constitutions
& laws against internal violence,”116 points out that minority factions could
take over state governments and implies that a national government might
have a remedial role. The eighth vice, “want of ratification by the people of
110. In his documentary supplement to the Convention records, Farrand cut all of this
discussion except for a single sentence. See 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 134, 135
(ellipses indicating the omissions). One might wonder whether Farrand was embarrassed or
felt sorry for Madison on account of his persistent advocacy of this unsuccessful idea.
111. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 87, at 210.
112. See MADISON, supra note 47, at 345–58.
113. See, e.g., BILDER, supra note 7, at 45.
114. MADISON, supra note 47, at 348–50.
115. Id. at 350.
116. Id.
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the articles of confederation,”117 argues that a constitution derived from state
legislatures is not supreme over state law and is a mere league.
The seventh vice “is want of sanction to the laws, and of coercion in the
Government of the Confederacy.”118 Rakove calls it “a mini-treatise” on
“the most important and revealing element in Madison’s analysis of the
underlying problem of American federalism.”119 But the only thing of note
about federalism Madison says in this passage is that the national government
needs coercive sanctions for its general laws; otherwise, states will resist
them due to self-interest or dissatisfaction with their unequal impact among
the states.120 This is neither a particularly penetrating nor original analysis
of the defects of the Confederation, nor any sort of “treatise” on federalism,
since it does not even touch on how to balance an effective central
government with local control. More importantly, Madison’s analysis is out
of step with the theory of federalism that was soon to be adopted by the
Convention. Rather than envisioning a national government empowered to
act directly on the people—a point absent from the discussion in the seventh
vice—Madison apparently assumes that the national government needs “a
sanction” to coerce states to comply with federal policies.121
The ninth through twelfth vices deal with the vicious character of state
laws from an intrastate perspective.122 The ninth and tenth vices criticize the
“multiplicity” and “mutability” of state laws—there are too many of them
and they are too easily changed.123 The twelfth vice consists only of a
heading, the “Impotence of the laws of the States,”124 with no further
comment, suggesting the manuscript was unfinished.
The eleventh vice, the “Injustice of the laws of States,”125 lays out a
version of Madison’s theory of the extended republic. Madison questions
“the fundamental principle of republican Government, that the majority who
rule in such Governments, are the safest Guardians both of public Good and
of private rights.”126 But where the majority consists of self-interested
factions, the state laws will result in vicious and unrepublican oppression of
creditors, property owners, and religious minorities.127 The extended

117. Id. at 352.
118. Id. at 351.
119. RAKOVE, supra note 63, at 47.
120. MADISON, supra note 47, at 351.
121. Madison criticizes laws “which depend[] for their execution on the will of the state
legislatures, wch. are tho’ nominally authoritative, in fact recommendatory only.” Id. at 351.
One could perhaps read this, out of context, as consistent with direct national regulation of the
people of the states. But Madison’s letter to Washington makes clear that he was
contemplating use of force to obtain state compliance. See Letter from James Madison to
George Washington, supra note 88, at 383 (observing that “the right of coercion should be
expressly declared” to “operat[e] by force on the collective will of a State”).
122. MADISON, supra note 47, at 353–57.
123. Id. at 353–55.
124. Id. at 358.
125. Id. at 354.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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republic answers a “great desideratum in Government,”128 since such
factions will not control the general government, which will be neutral
among the state-level factions and “controul one part of the Society from
invading the rights of another, and at the same time sufficiently controuled
itself, from setting up an interest adverse to that of the whole Society.”129
We will return to both Madison’s federal negative and his theory of the
extended republic in Part II. For now, we simply note that while the “Vices”
memorandum is interesting in several respects, it is a major disappointment
for any reader looking for an incisive analysis of American federalism. Only
two of the vices are explained at any length, and none of the discussions
makes a direct proposal for a specific government structure or theorizes how
sovereignty might be divided between the states and a national government.
None of the first ten vices can reasonably be characterized as penetrating or
highly original. The far more original and interesting elaboration of the
extended republic in the eleventh vice is anomalous for its length—at 1200
words, it takes up 40 percent of the length of the entire manuscript—but, as
Bilder has demonstrated, there are significant reasons to question whether it
was written before the Convention in April 1787, at the time Madison wrote
up the other vices.130 Either way, the main proposal emerging from
Madison’s effort seems clear. Unlike the structural provisions of the
Constitution ultimately proposed and ratified, the “Vices” memorandum
points to a national legislative veto as the only sure way to satisfy “the great
desideratum” in a national government.131

128. Id. at 357.
129. Id. at 358.
130. See BILDER, supra note 7, at 243–44 (documenting several of these reasons, including
the fact that the eleventh vice is written on different paper than the others).
131. We suspect that one reason many scholars rely on secondary source descriptions of
Madison’s pre-Convention writings, rather than reading them on their own, is because they
assume that the primary sources are lengthy and formidable. Yet they are not. The “Notes on
Ancient and Modern Confederacies” is the longest of the five documents, totaling just over
6900 words. See MADISON, supra note 46. Madison’s three letters to Jefferson, Randolph, and
Washington total about 5400 words, less than half of which deal with Madison’s ideas for a
new government. See supra notes 87, 88 and accompanying text. These ideas were repeated
in the three letters, of course, some passages almost verbatim. Taking that fact into account,
Madison laid out his ideas for a new government in these letters in no more than 1200 words—
what today would be merely a substantial blog post. The “Vices” memorandum, written in
mid-April of 1787, is about 3100 words, though as a result of Bilder’s scholarship, it seems
likely that the 1140-word section on the extended republic under the heading of “Vice 11” was
written during or after the Convention. See BILDER, supra note 7, at 243–46. If this is correct,
then Madison’s most significant analytical writing in preparation for the Convention in the
spring of 1787 consists of approximately 3200 words—the equivalent of about six-and onehalf pages in this law review. By way of comparison, the published version of James Wilson’s
“Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British
Parliament” is about 12,000 words, and his “Considerations on the Bank of North America”
is about 8000 words. See 1 JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 3–31, 60–
79 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
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d. The Missing Idea
As we shall see, the most fundamental principle that animated the
Constitution’s federalism design is the idea that the new national government
would operate directly on the people and not act through the states. This
would allow the national government to bypass the states, and control them
indirectly, through affirmative legislative supremacy rather than a direct veto
over state laws or a direct coercive power over the states as corporate bodies.
If Madison had truly shaped the Convention’s agenda and molded the final
form of the Constitution, we should expect to find this idea developed, or at
a minimum, clearly anticipated in his pre-Convention writings. Instead,
Madison’s focus was on controlling state governments. His discussion of the
seventh vice connected “want of sanction to the laws” with the absence of
“coercion” over the states, who resist national mandates.132 Nowhere do the
vices mention direct regulation of the people, and in only two sentences in
his letter to Washington does he even hint at the idea.133 Presumably,
Madison believed that the national government would directly collect
import/export taxes, as did the other advocates of a national impost in the
Confederation period.134 But to interpret this belief as a broad understanding
that Congress would indirectly control the states by legislating directly on the
people requires considerable interpretive enrichment, if not presentism and
confirmation bias. By “compleat authority,” Madison may also have meant,
and probably did mean in most cases, a power to bind the states—for
example, to force them to comply with a uniform commercial treaty—rather
than to bypass them by regulating individuals directly. Had Madison
possessed a well-developed notion of regulating the people directly, there
would have been little or no need for a power to coerce the states by force.
But in the letter to Washington, Madison expressly advocated that “the right
of coercion should be expressly declared”135 in a new Constitution.
To be sure, all of Madison’s pre-Convention writings were cursory and did
not purport to be highly developed theoretical or institutional proposals. Yet
it would have been a simple matter, in a sentence or two, to explain that
Congress should be empowered to regulate the people directly, if that idea
had been part of Madison’s thinking. Indeed, he would express that idea in
a few sentences in his Convention speech on July 14—but only after his

132. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
133. See Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 88, at 383
(mentioning “a system which would operate in many essential points without the intervention
of the State Legislatures”); id. (“[I]n addition to the present federal powers, the national
Government should be armed with positive and compleat authority in all cases which require
uniformity; such as the regulation of trade, including the right of taxing both exports &
imports, the fixing the terms and forms of naturalization, &c. &c.”).
134. See, e.g., Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (Sept. 12, 1786), in 9 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 46, at 122 (expressing fears that the Confederation
government would be endangered without a national impost). See generally RAKOVE, supra
note 92, at 337–38 (discussing widespread but not unanimous support for a national impost).
135. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 88, at 385.
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leading colleagues had been making the point for weeks.136 It is also true
that Madison was apparently queasy about coercing the states, expressing
reservations about it both to Washington and early in the Convention.137 But
he saw the alternative, not as a power to regulate the people directly, but
rather to control the states through the national legislative veto. Given “the
difficulty & awkwardness of operating by force on the collective will of a
State,” Madison hoped that “the negative on the laws might create such a
mutuality of dependence between the general and particular authorities, as to
answer this purpose.”138 We elaborate on the discrepancy between
Madison’s focus on controlling states and the Convention’s solution of
regulating the people directly further in Part II.
3. Madison and the Virginia Plan
The fifteen resolutions known as the Virginia Plan were introduced by
Virginia delegate Edmund Randolph on May 29, the Convention’s first day
of substantive discussion, and set the initial agenda for the proceedings.139
Commentators generally assume that Madison authored the plan or that, at a
minimum, he “played the leading role” in drafting it.140 Madison’s
reputation as “father of the Constitution” owes a great deal to this
assumption.141 But, as with so many other elements of the persistent
mythology surrounding Madison, the claim is adopted uncritically.
Madison’s admirers either treat it as common knowledge that needs no
evidentiary support or else subtly misconstrue or overinterpret the relevant
evidence. Typical in this regard is Lance Banning’s sweeping assertion that
“Madison . . . was the man to whom Virginia politicians customarily deferred
on federal issues. He had suggested all the key provisions of the plan in his
pre-Convention writings. Contemporaries understood that it was principally
his work . . . .”142 To support these claims, Banning points to three letters—
two written by Madison himself—all of which indicate that the Virginia Plan
136. See infra Part II.A.2.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 100–01.
138. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 88, at 385.
139. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 20–23 (text of plan); see also id. at 30
(recording that the Virginia Plan was “taken up” for discussion “to consider the State of the
American union”); see also BRANT, supra note 3, at 23–31.
140. BANNING, supra note 3, at 113; accord, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 29, at 87 (“The plan
was largely Madison’s handiwork . . . .”); FISKE, supra note 15, at 251 (noting the Plan’s
“chief author was Madison”). Even Forrest McDonald, who argues that the final Constitution
differed markedly from Madison’s views, assumes that Madison authored the Virginia Plan.
See FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 205 (1985).
141. See, e.g., RICHARD B. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT THE CREATION 19 (1985) (observing that
Madison is called “‘the father of the Constitution’ because the initial plan attributed to him
provided the basic blueprint for the final document”); Gordon Wood, The Company of Giants,
NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 2011, at 25, 27 (reviewing ANDREW BURNSTEIN & NANCY ISENBERG,
MADISON AND JEFFERSON (2013)) (explaining that “there is no doubt that no single person
contributed more to the Constitution than [Madison] did, since his Virginia Plan remained the
working model for the final document”).
142. BANNING, supra note 3, at 115.
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was the joint product of the Virginia delegation, with likely input from other
delegations as well.143 Furthermore, none of these letters, nor any other
historical records known to us, supports Banning’s further contention that
Madison had proposed all of the key provisions of the Virginia Plan before
the Convention or that his contemporaries “understood that [the plan] was
principally his work.”
Because the Virginia Plan is so important to the standard narrative about
Madison, it is worth elaborating these points. To begin with, consider two
notable evidentiary gaps. First, none of the Virginia delegates—including
Madison himself—ever attributed the Virginia Plan to him, and both during
and after the Convention, the uniform practice was to attribute the resolutions
it contained to Randolph.144 Second, there is no pre-Convention draft of the
Virginia Plan in Madison’s papers. Charles Pinckney arrived in Philadelphia
with a draft Constitution; Madison, despite being purportedly the “best
prepared” delegate, apparently did not.145
More generally, there is no evidence that Madison or any other Virginian
arrived in Philadelphia with the Virginia Plan resolutions fully conceived.
Instead, the limited evidence we possess suggests that these resolutions were
drafted sometime between May 14 and May 29, the two-week period during
which two large state delegations—Virginia and Pennsylvania—met
regularly while waiting for the other delegates to trickle in.146 The idea that
Madison dominated the exchange of ideas produced in these meetings seems
improbable. The Virginia delegation included at least four men—
Washington, Mason, George Wythe, and John Blair—who were more
accomplished and influential than Madison in 1787, and a fifth—Randolph—
who was at least equally so.147 Mason, for example, was an experienced
143. The three letters Banning cites are: Letter from George Mason to George Mason Jr.
(May 20, 1787), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 22, 23 (attributing the main ideas
of the Virginia Plan to “the principal States,” not just to the Virginia delegation); Letter from
James Madison’s to Noah Webster (Oct. 12, 1804), in FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at
409, 409 (“[T]he deputies from Virginia . . . agreed among themselves on the outline of a
plan . . . .”); Unsent Letter from Madison to John Tyler (n.d.), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 27, at 524, 525 (noting that the Virginia Plan resolutions “were the result of a consultation
among the deputies, the whole number, seven being present”).
144. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 20 (“Resolutions proposed by Mr.
Randolph in Convention.”); id. at 313 (discussing “the resolutions offered by the honorable
Mr. Randolph”); id. at 321 (“the scheme of Mr. Randolph”); id. at 322 (noting “Mr.
Randolph’s plan”); 3 id. at 532 (referring to “[t]he propositions of Mr. Randolph”); id. at 535
(noting “Mr. Randolph’s plan”); id. at 593 (“These resolutions, commonly known as the
Randolph Resolutions . . . .”); see also, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 29, at 87; MADISON, supra
note 45, at 16–17.
145. See supra Part I.B.1.
146. See infra notes 163–68 and accompanying text.
147. In 1787, George Wythe was sixty-one years old and one of the most respected jurists
in the United States. Among other activities, he began serving in the Virginia House of
Burgesses in 1754, played an active role in opposing the Stamp Act in 1765, represented
Virginia in the Second Continental Congress, and signed the Declaration of Independence.
See generally IMOGEN E. BROWN, AMERICAN ARISTIDES: A BIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE WYTHE
(1981). He also was a judge on the Virginia High Court of Chancery, a law professor at the
College of William & Mary, and an instructor of and mentor to many prominent Virginia
lawyers, including Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, James Monroe, and St. George Tucker.
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constitution drafter who had written Virginia’s Declaration of Rights, which
served as a model for other state constitutions up and down the continent,148
while Randolph was the sitting governor and former attorney general of
Virginia, as well as one of its best lawyers and the scion of its most powerful
and illustrious family.149 Like Madison, Randolph served for several years
in the Continental Congress and attended the Annapolis Convention. He
drafted or helped to draft many significant memoranda and legislative
proposals during his career—including the first draft of a constitution for the
Committee of Detail—and he was good at it.150 Furthermore, it was
Randolph who first suggested to Madison that Virginia take the lead at
presenting resolutions at the Convention rather than the other way around.151
In short, one cannot simply assume that Randolph or any of these men would
have been bereft of constitutional ideas or simply deferred to Madison “on
federal issues.”
Although Banning is not alone in holding that there is a conclusive match
between the Virginia Plan and Madison’s pre-Convention writings, this claim
does not hold up under close scrutiny.152 Most of the plan’s fifteen
resolutions expressed either widespread ideas of constitutional reformers in
the spring of 1787 or details that are absent from Madison’s pre-Convention
writings. In particular, Resolutions I through V propose that the
Confederation be “enlarged” with a bicameral legislature based on
proportional representation in both houses.153 Resolutions VII and IX deal
respectively with the executive and judiciary, to which Madison gave only
passing attention.154 Resolution X deals with admission of new states, and
Resolutions XII through XIV deal with lesser, fairly obvious details, which
Madison had not addressed at all in his pre-Convention letters.155 Madison
Id. For his part, John Blair was fifty-five years old at the start of the Convention—two decades
older than Madison—and likewise a seasoned veteran of Virginia law and politics. See THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 77–78 (Kermit L. Hall
ed., 1992). Beginning in 1766, Blair served for over twenty years in the Virginia House of
Burgesses, Governor’s Council, Privy Council, General Court, Court of Appeals, and Court
of Chancery. Id. For Randolph’s relevant biographical details, see infra notes 150–51 and
accompanying text.
148. See The Founding Fathers: Virginia, supra note 147.
149. See id.
150. See, e.g., 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 92, at 861–71
(documenting a report drafted primarily by Randolph on regulating U.S. admiralty courts); id.
at 894–96 (including a report by Randolph, Oliver Ellsworth, and James Varnum on enlarging
the powers of Congress); 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 137–50 (featuring
Randolph’s draft constitution for the Committee of Detail); H.R. REP. NO. 1-17 (1790),
reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 21 (Walter Lowrie & Walter
Franklin eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834) (reprinting a report by Randolph on
reforming the federal judiciary).
151. See Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Mar. 27, 1787), in 9 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 46, at 335.
152. See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 3, at 115; RAKOVE, supra note 3, at 60; see also John
Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1052 n.25 (2014) (citing
additional sources).
153. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 20–21.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 21–23.
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might have been out front with the idea of ratification by state conventions
rather than state legislatures (Resolution XV), though as we have seen he was
not alone in embracing this idea. Likewise, Madison was not the only
advocate of a council of revision (Resolution VIII).156
The most distinctively Madisonian proposals in the Virginia Plan are
contained in parts of Resolution VI, including the federal negative and the
use of force against noncomplying states, and Resolution XI, guaranteeing
the states a republican government.157 But the other delegates in these preConvention meetings quickly clipped the wings of Madison’s proposed
federal negative “in all cases whatsoever” in favor of a more limited power
to negative state laws “contravening . . . the articles of union”—a significant
and notable revision.158 Moreover, as one of us has explained in depth, the
affirmative grant of legislative power in Resolution VI uses terms different
from those in Madison’s pre-Convention correspondence and more like the
language that Wilson, Franklin, and other Pennsylvanians had advocated for
many years to delineate the scope of congressional power.159 In his 1785
essay on the Bank of North America, for example, Wilson had argued that
the national government was empowered to act “whenever” states were not
“competent” or their joint actions were unlikely “to produce a harmony.”160
In contrast, Madison’s description of federal legislative power had focused
only on the need for “uniformity” and did not address state collective action
problems as a general category of congressional authority.161 In general,
Madison proposed to address state disharmony through the federal negative,
rather than affirmative legislation.162
Wilson’s apparent fingerprints on Resolution VI raise a key question to
which few historians have given sufficient attention: how extensively were
the Virginians collaborating with the Pennsylvania delegates at this stage?163
These two “large state” delegations were closely allied on many of the key
issues at the start of the Convention, especially proportional representation
in the Senate. Pennsylvania’s delegation had intellectual firepower that
easily matched the Virginians. In addition to Wilson and Franklin, the
Pennsylvania delegation included the brilliant and highly opinionated
Gouverneur Morris and the domineering Robert Morris, who had strong
ideas about national power based on his tenure as superintendent of finance.
There is circumstantial evidence of joint discussions between these two
delegations.164 They were the only two groups that showed up at the
statehouse for the appointed first day on May 14, and they continued to do
156. See, e.g., Letter from John Jay to George Washington, supra note 95, at 503.
157. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 20–21.
158. Id. at 21.
159. See Mikhail, supra note 152, at 1051, 1072–78.
160. See JAMES WILSON, Considerations on the Bank of North America, in 1 COLLECTED
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 131, at 60, 66–67.
161. See Mikhail, supra note 152, at 1073–78.
162. See id.
163. Virtually none of the standard histories of the Convention address this issue. The only
exception of which we are aware is Richard Beeman’s. See BEEMAN, supra note 29, at 41–57.
164. See id. (recounting the occasions on which the two delegations conferred).
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so daily in hope of a quorum.165 They met for a lengthy dinner at Franklin’s
house on May 16.166 George Washington was staying at Robert Morris’s
home.167 In his May 20 letter to his son, George Mason reported having
“occasional conversation with the deputies of different States,” from which
he discerned that “the principal States”—which undoubtedly included
Pennsylvania—share the “prevalent idea” of creating “a total alteration of the
present federal system” containing the elements of what would be the
Virginia Plan.168
We have little doubt that Madison had important input in formulating the
Virginia Plan. But his unlikely authorship of the affirmative grant of
legislative authority in Resolution VI and his grudging compromise on the
precise form of the federal negative—during the Convention he would move
unsuccessfully to restore his “in all cases” version after his preferred version
was brushed aside as early as May 20169—demonstrate that he did not
dominate the May gatherings that produced the Virginia Plan. Furthermore,
the common assumption that Madison simply wrote the plan by himself is
not supported by any documentary evidence—and is arguably at odds with
the fact that the plan was generally attributed to Randolph, not Madison,
during and after the Convention.170 To assume that Randolph was merely
Madison’s mouthpiece in introducing the plan is to beg the question. In light
of everything we know or can reasonably infer about how this particular
sausage was made, the Virginia Plan was most likely a collective effort,
probably drafted by Randolph, which incorporated prevalent ideas shared by
most of the Virginia and Pennsylvania delegates who were present in
Philadelphia from May 14 to 29. As such, the Virginia Plan offers a flimsy
basis for the claim that Madison was the father of the Constitution.
4. Madison and the Finished Constitution
Madison was unquestionably active at the Constitutional Convention,
making more recorded speeches than all but two delegates—Gouverneur
Morris and James Wilson.171 He made or seconded numerous motions from
the Convention floor to add, delete, or amend provisions of the draft
165. See id.
166. See id. at 34–35.
167. See id. at 52–53.
168. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 23. Notably, Mason reported on May 21
that the federal negative envisioned by “the principal States” was the power of “a negative
upon all such laws as they judge contrary to the principles and interest of the Union,” a
formulation that seems closer to the one included in the Virginia Plan than Madison’s
preferred version. Id. at 24.
169. See id.
170. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
171. See Delegates’ Speeches, Motions, and Committee Assignments in the Constitutional
Convention, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE AM. CONST., https://csac.history.wisc.edu/documentcollections/the-constitutional-convention/delegates-speeches-motions-and-committeeassignments-in-the-constitutional-convention [https://perma.cc/QAP3-UEWK] (last visited
Mar. 16, 2021). For earlier tabulations with similar results, see ROSSITER, supra note 29, at
252; WARREN, supra note 40, at 125.
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Constitution—though more than half were defeated—and he occasionally
suggested specific language that made its way into the finished
Constitution.172 Yet the idea that Madison was the leader of the Convention
or indispensable to its success cannot be squared with the historical record.
The documentary evidence suggests that the two principal draftsmen of the
Constitution, who were responsible for the bulk of the specific language and
structure of the final text, were Wilson and Morris.173 Randolph, Rutledge,
and Charles Pinckney made important contributions in this regard,174 and
Roger Sherman also had a substantial impact, shaping the course of the
Convention at important moments.175 Other delegates who played a leading
role in supplying specific language or important structural features that were
retained in the final document include John Dickinson, George Mason,
Oliver Ellsworth, and William Paterson.176 Judged by his actual influence
on the final design and language of the Constitution, Madison might most
accurately be included in this second or third group of most important
delegates, but either way, one would be hard pressed to show that he was
significantly more influential than any of them.
Madison was passed over in favor of Mason and Randolph for the first two
crucial committee assignments: the Grand Committee that proposed the
Great Compromise in mid-July and the Committee of Detail that produced
the first draft of the Constitution in early August.177 In fact, he was not
selected for an important committee assignment until August 22.178 Madison
was a member of the Committee of Style and Arrangement that made final
revisions to the Constitution, but there is no evidence that he made any
discernible impact on its work, which was led by Morris, with an apparent
assist from Wilson.179 Furthermore, Madison’s two most significant
proposals over the course of the summer—the federal negative and
proportional representation in the Senate—were defeated.180
As Michael McConnell aptly remarks, Madison “was a quintessentially
legislative personality,”181 and it is well known that he gave less reflection,
and supplied relatively little input, to the design of the executive and judicial
172. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 489 (recording Madison’s
successful effort to modify the language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
173. See, e.g., WARREN, supra note 40, at 686–88; William Ewald & Lorraine Updike
Toler, Committee of Detail Documents, 135 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 239 (2011);
William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197 (2012); John Mikhail,
Fixing Implied Constitutional Powers in the Founding Era, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 507 (2019);
William M. Treanor, The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener: Gouverneur Morris and the
Creation of the Federalist Constitution, 119 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
174. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 137–50, 163–75 (Randolph and
Rutledge); see also, e.g., 2 id. at 324–26 (Pinckney).
175. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 73, at 92–121.
176. See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 29, at 161–64, 282–83; WARREN, supra note 40, at 57.
177. See supra note 26.
178. See BILDER, supra note 7, at 141–43.
179. See WARREN, supra note 40, at 686–88 (summarizing the evidence that Morris and
Wilson were jointly responsible for the final revisions to the Constitution).
180. See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text.
181. MICHAEL MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING 21 (2020).
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branches of government.182 The chief architect of the presidency was not
Madison, but Wilson, who clearly came prepared with strong ideas about
executive power and who, as William Ewald recounts,
from the first week of the Convention until its end, argued consistently and
ultimately successfully for the structure that eventually emerged: a single
President, elected for a relatively short term, eligible for re-election,
wielding a veto power, and enjoying authority independently both of the
Congress and of the legislatures of the states.183

Together with Rutledge and the other members of the Committee of Detail,
Wilson was also principally responsible for the general allocation of royal
powers and the specific enumeration of executive powers in Article II.184
Meanwhile, the judicial powers and jurisdictional grants of Article III were
primarily crafted by Wilson and Randolph, with some input from others.185
Again, Madison was not a key figure in this process. Even the so-called
“Madisonian compromise,” to which legal scholars commonly refer when
discussing the discretionary authority lodged in Congress to create inferior
federal courts, cannot be considered principally Madison’s contribution.186
When the Convention voted to eliminate the mandatory nature of these courts
on June 5, it was Wilson, seconded by Madison, who argued for giving
Congress the discretionary power to create them.187 Calling this compromise
“Madisonian” rather than “Wilsonian” is another illustration of the tendency
to exaggerate Madison’s contributions to the framing of the Constitution at
the expense of other delegates.
Apparently, it never occurred to any historian to compare Madison’s views
on specific proposals and provisions with the Constitution reported out by
the Convention, until Forrest McDonald did so in 1985.188 In a brisk fourpage summary, McDonald “reconstructed a Madisonian Constitution” by
“working through all the particular proposals” that Madison supported or
182. This one-sided nature of Madison’s constitutional thinking is reflected in the fact that
his contributions to The Federalist are predominantly focused on legislative power (and, to a
lesser extent, federalism). See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 14, 18–20, 37–58, 62–63,
supra note 49 (James Madison). The division of labor in these essays, in which Hamilton took
the primary responsibility for discussing executive and judicial powers, along with fiscal and
military affairs, and Jay addressed foreign affairs, is not given enough attention by scholars.
183. William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 901, 1004 (2008).
184. See MCCONNELL, supra note 181, at 38–39, 67–74.
185. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 129–89 (reproducing Wilson’s and
Randolph’s drafts for the Committee of Detail).
186. For the origin of this questionable label, see Martin H. Redish, Constitutional
Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor
Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143, 145 n.12 (1982); Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods,
Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review
and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 47–48, 48 n.8 (1975).
187. The documentary records on this point are somewhat ambiguous. Compare, e.g., 1
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 118 (Madison’s notes) (stating that “Mr. Wilson &
Mr. Madison moved” to add this power), with id. at 127 (Yates’s notes) (“Mr. Wilson then
moved . . . .”).
188. MCDONALD, supra note 140, at 205–09.
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opposed, as reflected in the Convention records.189 For example, McDonald
points out that Madison never advocated state sovereignty or even agency at
the Convention but instead subordinated state sovereignty to other concerns;
advocated limiting suffrage to “freeholders”; proposed a Senate based on
proportional representation and structured to represent wealth, with its
members chosen by electors representing the freeholder-voters (rather than
by state legislatures); and advocated a six-member executive advisory
council that would be authorized to make treaties of alliance and peace
without a two-thirds Senate majority and whose members, with the U.S.
Supreme Court, would sit on a council of legislative revision.190 With some
understatement, McDonald concludes that the final Constitution endorsed by
the Convention “bears limited resemblance” to Madison’s favored ideas.191
Given the centrality of the federal negative to Madison’s overall plan for
the Convention, it is surprising how many commentators maintain the view
of Madison as the father of the Constitution. Admiring scholars either
explain its absence away192 or sweep it under the rug.193 Moreover, an
unbiased reading of Madison’s October 24, 1787, letter to Jefferson yields
the strong impression that Madison was both dissatisfied with the
Constitution and less integral to how it was drafted than many scholars have
assumed.194 In sum, like the other elements of the unfounded paternity claim,
the final product of the Convention does not support Madison’s privileged
status as the father of the Constitution.
II. NOT YOUR CONSTITUTION’S THEORIST
Madison is widely held to be the leading constitutional theorist of the
founding era.195 This reputation is based largely on his supposed ideas about
the Constitution’s federalism structures.
The primary problem of
constitutional reform in 1787—rearranging the balance of power between the
states and the general government—sounded in federalism. So did
Madison’s most sustained thinking about constitutional reform before the
Convention. While Madison had important ideas on other constitutional
subjects over the course of his career, his reputation as “the philosopher of
the Constitution” and “America’s leading constitutional theorist” rests

189. Id.
190. See id.
191. Id. For two other detailed studies along these lines, see Ewald, supra note 183; David
Brian Robertson, Madison’s Opponents and Constitutional Design, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 225
(2005).
192. See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 3, at 118–19 (arguing that Madison’s negative reflected
“a critical acuity that proved unanswerable” and paved the way for significant reforms.).
193. See, e.g., 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 135 (reprinting Farrand’s edited
version of Madison’s October 24, 1787, letter to Jefferson, which excises Madison’s ongoing
advocacy of the federal negative).
194. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 87.
195. See, e.g., ADAIR, supra note 3; BANNING, supra note 3; RAKOVE, supra note 63.
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primarily on the ideas of federalism he formulated in 1787, before, during,
and shortly after the Convention, culminating in Federalist 10.196
Confusingly to those scholars interested in making a fresh assessment,
Madison’s leading interpreters have long tended to vacillate on what exactly
his brilliant ideas were—flitting between Federalist 10 and his earlier
writings and then back again, insisting that the other is the brilliant bit
whenever the one under consideration seems lacking, treating widely shared
ideas as Madisonian innovations, or elaborating Madison’s underdeveloped
ideas with pages of exegesis for every sentence of Madison’s own.197 “In
our eagerness to make Madison the most profound political theorist . . . in all
American history,” writes Gordon Wood, “we may have burdened this
eighteenth-century political leader with more theoretical sophistication than
he or any such politician can bear.”198 So true. What, in this part, we will
call Madison’s “Convention corpus”—the surprisingly thin body of writings
comprising his Convention speeches and pre- and post-Convention
correspondence, together with “Vices” and Federalist 10—amounts to the
length of approximately one law review article. It can be read and assessed
without feeling overawed by its length, brilliance, or the exegesis of other
scholars.
Taking this body of work as a whole, we find little reason to believe that
Madison was an unusually skilled or perceptive constitutional theorist in
1787, at least when compared with his most important peers. As Alison
LaCroix has observed, the core theoretical problem of federalism was “to
explain why [a] scheme of . . . ‘jurisdictional redundancy’ did not violate
contemporary theory’s proscription of imperium in imperio, or a government
within a government.”199 Madison recognized this issue, and in his postConvention gloom, he concluded that the Constitution would be a flop
because it had failed to solve “the evil of imperia in imperio.”200 Yet
196. RAKOVE, supra note 63, at 5. As indicated, we recognize that a complete assessment
of Madison’s constitutional ideas would require considering additional sources and episodes
of his career. For example, to evaluate fully his ideas about federalism, one would need to
consider his analysis of federal-state relations in THE FEDERALIST NOS. 39, 45–46, supra note
49 (James Madison). Because of the word limits of this Essay, our discussion is necessarily
circumscribed. See infra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
198. WOOD, supra note 6, at 155. Rakove gestures in this direction yet seems uncertain
about what lessons to draw. Compare RAKOVE, supra note 63, at 5–7, 17–18 (observing “how
little [Madison] wrote for publication and persuasion” and that his ideas were those of “an
exceptionally creative politician” rather than an “authoritative commentator on the origins of
the American constitution”), with id. at 5 (“Madison is our leading constitutionalist, both as a
political actor and a political theorist”), and id. at 20 (arguing that Madison was “the one
delegate who worked hardest . . . to make sense of [the Constitution’s] meaning”).
199. LaCroix, supra note 12, at 457 (quoting Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional
Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 638 (1981)); see
also BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 358 (1967)
(“The key doctrine of federalism could survive criticism only to the extent that it could
somehow be distinguished from the ancient belief that imperium in imperio was an illogical
and unresolvable solecism . . . .”); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Imperia in Imperio: The Multiple
Constitutions of Empire in New York, 1750–1777, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 319 (1998).
200. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 87.
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Madison was mistaken. His own diagnosis of the core problem of
federalism—the vices of the states—was misguided, and his cure for this
misdiagnosed problem—the federal negative—was impractical and rejected
by the other delegates. Instead, the Framers opted for a system of affirmative
legislative supremacy and federal preemption, controlling the states not by a
direct veto over their lawmaking but by regulating the people directly and
thereby bypassing the states entirely. Madison’s postmortem assessment of
this system as a failure reflected his own inability or unwillingness to
appreciate how this solution would work—and thereby, how the new
Constitution proposed to address the core problem of federalism. For its part,
Federalist 10 had little or no impact on the founding. To a large extent, this
is because relatively few Americans were even aware of Madison’s famous
essay at the time, as Larry Kramer has demonstrated;201 but it also stems from
the fact that the problem to which Madison’s theory of the extended republic
in Federalist 10 was addressed was not the core problem of American
federalism.
A. Madison’s Misguided Theory of Federalism
In diagnosing the flaws of the confederation system, Madison obsessed
over the vices of state governments: their domination of minorities, their
interferences with one another, and their encroachment on federal authority.
For Madison, “[t]he great desideratum” in advance of the Convention was to
configure national authority as a “disinterested & dispassionate umpire in
disputes between different passions & interests” emanating from state
factions.202 Madison’s analysis may have been accurate as far as it went, but
it was myopic and radically incomplete, and it led him to fixate on a flawed
solution, the federal negative, which was a structural idea for controlling state
governments. As he explained to Jefferson, the negative was Madison’s
solution to “the evil of imperia in imperio.”203 In a penetrating analysis,
Alison LaCroix captured its true significance: Madison was proposing
nothing less than “merging two levels of government power into one
compound legislature.”204
By contrast, Madison’s most influential colleagues believed that the
Confederation’s principal weakness was the “imbecility” of the general
government—its lack of sufficient powers to enact and enforce legislation.
The main thrust of constitutional reform, as they saw it, was to empower the
national government to act directly and affirmatively on the people.205 This
201. See Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 664–71 (1999).
202. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 88, at 384.
203. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 87.
204. LaCroix, supra note 12, at 487.
205. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 255 (“Mr. Randolph[] was not
scrupulous on the point of power . . . . He painted in strong colours, the imbecility of the
existing confederacy.”); cf. EDLING, supra note 2, at 7 (“Far from concerning themselves with
how to erect barriers to government, the Federalists argued for a national government with the
ability to act. In this sense, Madisonian Federalism seems strangely out of tune with the basic
thrust of the Federalist argument.”); see also infra Part II.A.2.
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would require the recognition of some new powers and the transfer of others
from the states to the general government. Above all, the power to regulate
the people directly would eliminate the general government’s dependence on
the states; this technique would effectively control the state legislatures
indirectly, by bypassing them. Ironically, empowering the national
government in this way left the states with more residual sovereignty than
Madison’s negative would have, even though Madison’s own professed
objective was to design a federalist system that would “be the least possible
encroachment on the State jurisdictions.”206
The federal negative was the keystone of Madison’s thinking about
federalism. Few scholars have both emphasized that fact and appreciated its
full significance for assessing Madison’s constitutional thought.207 While
the federal negative may have been an apt solution for Madison’s
idiosyncratic diagnosis of the principle vices of the Confederation—the lack
of national control over state legislation—it bore so little resemblance to the
theoretical and practical solutions adopted by the Convention that his
persistent advocacy of this idea should by itself cause us to question his
celebrated status as “as our leading constitutional thinker.”208 But even more
than that, Madison’s insistence that the Constitution was fatally defective
without his legislative veto reveals his questionable grasp of how the
Constitution in fact attempted to solve the problem of imperium in imperio.
1. A Flawed Remedy: Madison’s Federal Negative
Madison advocated a national legislative veto that would operate, in effect,
as a preclearance remedy for all state and local laws. He urged this in his
March and April letters to Jefferson, Randolph, and Washington.209 As noted
above, this was one of the ideas that most distinctively belonged to Madison,
although his colleagues forced him to scale it down from a negative applying
206. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 88, at 383.
207. Charles Hobson’s 1979 article may have been the first to emphasize the centrality of
the negative to Madison’s constitutional ideas. See Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on State
Laws: James Madison, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 WM.
& MARY Q. 215, 216 (1979); see also LaCroix, supra note 12. Gordon Wood is especially
perceptive on this score, explaining that, for Madison, “the weaknesses of the Confederation,
which nearly everyone seemed to acknowledge, seemed secondary to the vices within the
several states.” WOOD, supra note 6, at 157. “Many” of Madison’s nationalist colleagues “did
not agree with the strange judiciallike manner in which [Madison] hoped to deal with the
factional politics he found in the states”—by means of the “truly odd” federal negative. Id. at
158. Madison, Wood concludes, was less interested in building a true national government
than to create a central “judiciallike umpire” to “simply control[] popular politics in the states
and protect minority rights.” Id. at 165. We agree with Wood’s analysis. Yet Wood neglects
to follow these insights through to their logical conclusion: that Madison’s entire theory of
American federalism in 1787 was flawed, that he failed at the time to appreciate or understand
the solution his colleagues adopted, and that his colleagues were more insightful about how to
solve the problem of federalism than he was. Even more strangely, five years later, Wood
reverted to calling Madison “the major architect of the Constitution.” Wood, supra note 141,
at 26.
208. RAKOVE, supra note 63, at 5.
209. See supra Part I.B.2.
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“in all cases whatsoever” to one limited to laws “contravening the articles of
union”210 before presenting it as part of the Virginia Plan. In the first detailed
debate on the negative on June 8, Charles Pinckney signaled his support for
Madison’s idea when he moved to replace the Virginia Plan’s negative on
unconstitutional state laws with a power “to negative all Laws which [the
national legislature] shd. judge to be improper.”211 Madison quickly
seconded the motion, arguing that “an indefinite power to negative legislative
acts of the States [w]as absolutely necessary to a perfect system.”212 For
Madison, the negative flowed directly from his analysis in the “Vices”
memorandum, and he summarized the principal vices to support Pinckney’s
motion: “Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to
encroach on the federal authority; to violate national Treaties, to infringe the
rights & interests of each other; to oppress the weaker party within their
respective jurisdictions.”213
Madison apparently assumed that the negative would operate as
preclearance-type remedy, suspending state laws until they could be
reviewed and approved by the national legislature. As Madison explained in
a second debate on the negative on July 17, this remedy was needed because
otherwise states “can pass laws which will accomplish their injurious objects
before they can be repealed by the General Legislature or be set aside by the
National Tribunals.”214 Under his federal negative, therefore, “[t]he States
could of themselves then pass no operative act, any more than one branch of
a Legislature where there are two branches, can proceed without the
other.”215 In effect, as LaCroix observes, Madison was proposing a
compound legislature.216 “The negative (on the State laws),” Madison
explained, “will make [Congress] an essential branch of the State
Legislatures.”217
Aside from its political impracticality—several delegates persuasively
argued that the negative would undermine any hope of ratification218—
Madison’s negative suffered from a major procedural impracticality. Each
year, hundreds of laws, regulating the location of butcher shops, the storage
of gunpowder, the height of fence posts, and the like219 would be submitted
to Congress, where they would hang in suspended animation awaiting
210. Compare Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 88
(containing a reference to “all cases”), with 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 21 (using
the new language of “contravening . . . articles of Union”).
211. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 164 (emphasis added).
212. Id. at 164.
213. Id.
214. 2 id. at 27.
215. 1 id. at 165.
216. LaCroix, supra note 12, at 481.
217. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 447.
218. See, e.g., id. at 165 (Gerry) (stating that Madison’s proposal “would enslave the
States”); 2 id. at 28 (Morris) (“The proposal of it would disgust all the States”); id. at 391
(Rutledge) (“If nothing else, this alone would damn and ought to damn the Constitution”).
219. See generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
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congressional action, clogging its agenda and distracting it from national
business. When these objections were raised by other delegates, Madison
responded unconvincingly. The negative could be lodged in the Senate, he
suggested, which Madison anticipated would sit year-round; and state laws
“of urgent necessity” could be given temporary approval “by some
emanation of the power from the Natl. Govt. into each State” as had been
“the practice in Royal Colonies before the Revolution.”220 Federally
appointed governors in the states? Despite his supposedly unrivaled
preparation, Madison clearly had not thought his idea through.221
A second problem apparently eluded all of the delegates, but Madison, at
least, should have seen it, if his thinking were as systematic as his admirers
would have us believe. One of Madison’s chief assumptions about states—
emphasized in “Vices”—was their unwillingness to comply with
congressional commands. For Madison, the federal negative was necessary
in part because of this bad state behavior. Yet Madison gave no explanation,
either before, during, or after the Convention, of how the negative would
solve this problem, except to assert hopefully that the mere “existence of such
a check would prevent” states from attempting to enact mischievous laws.222
Yet it is hard to see why states would be more likely to comply with a national
legislative veto than with a tax requisition, treaty, or other federal mandate.
What was to stop the states from simply enforcing their laws without waiting
for congressional approval and then ignoring any negative issued by
Congress? Madison never addressed this question.
2. Madison’s Faulty Conception of Federalism
As we have seen, Madison believed the core problem of federalism was
the need for direct federal control of state legislatures. He apparently failed
to understand how the power to regulate the people directly could also
indirectly control the states by bypassing them and making state laws
irrelevant. In his pre-Convention letters, Madison did no more than hint that
the national legislature would have a small handful of direct legislative
powers over the people.223 But none of his pre-Convention writings said
anything about the importance of regulating the people directly as a means
of bypassing and thereby controlling the states. Instead, Madison
consistently emphasized controlling state legislatures directly by means of
the negative.
At the Convention, while many of his colleagues viewed the problem of
federalism as one of coordinating two levels of affirmative governmental
powers, Madison was stuck on viewing constitutional reform as primarily
aimed at the direct control of state governments. From June 4 to July 17, the
Convention debated federalism: the structure of representation in the
national legislature, the theoretical nature of the general government—
220.
221.
222.
223.

1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 168.
Accord Hobson, supra note 207, at 215.
1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 164.
See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
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national or federal—and the sovereignty of the states.224 In this period,
Madison made over a dozen significant speeches, all of them demonstrating
that his primary concern was to control state legislative excesses. As late as
June 19, in a speech attacking the New Jersey Plan, Madison stated his view
that the twofold purpose of the Constitutional Convention was “1. To
preserve the Union. 2. To provide a government that will remedy the evils
felt by the States both in their united and individual capacities.”225
Throughout this period, Madison focused particularly on proportional
representation in the Senate. The Senate was to serve as a neutral umpire,
supplying the “great desideratum” of resolving “disputes between different
passions & interests” in the states by means of the federal negative.226 In
Madison’s mind, equal suffrage in the Senate would undermine that
neutrality, presumably because the members would channel the majority
factional interests of their respective states. How proportional representation
in the Senate would counteract that was something of a mystery—
particularly once the Convention decided on June 25 (against Madison’s
wishes) that state legislatures would choose senators.227 Regardless,
proportional representation in the Senate was far more important for Madison
than theoretical questions about sovereignty. As the smaller states’ demand
for equal voting strength in the Senate persisted, Madison increasingly
gravitated toward the view that the states were not sovereign entities and
might be better conceived as corporations or counties.228 That drift revealed
that his commitment to proportional Senate representation predominated
over his other federalism concerns.
During this time, Wilson, Hamilton, and King all found theoretical
significance in the national government’s positive power to regulate the
people directly. For Hamilton, national legislative power would generate
“distributive justice, and all those acts which familiarize & endear Govt. to a
people”; for that reason, he believed the national legislature should be
empowered “to pass all laws whatsoever.”229 Wilson argued, “A private
citizen of a State is indifferent whether [the legislative] power be exercised
by the Genl. or State Legislatures, provided it be exercised most for his
happiness.”230 The “[general government] . . . is an assemblage” of “the
individuals . . . to be represented in it.”231 For Wilson, regulation and
representation were reciprocal: the power to regulate the people directly
required not only proportional representation in the Senate but direct popular
election of its members.232 King explained that “the proposed Government

224.
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See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 93 (June 4, 1787); 2 id. at 21 (July 17,
1 id. at 168.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 449, 463–64.
Id. at 284, 291.
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[is] substantially and formally, a General and National Government over the
people,” which would “never . . . act as a federal Government on the
States.”233 Because the government “was to operate on the people,” it had to
be “proportioned to them.”234
Not until June 28 did Madison come around to emphasizing that the
Virginia Plan proposed a “national” rather than a “federal” constitution
because it operated directly on the people.235 But he did so only after his
Convention allies repeatedly made this point and, moreover, he did not
conceptualize that relationship as a way to control the states by bypassing
them.236 Instead, he argued that the “compleat power of taxation” and the
“[m]any other powers” to regulate the people that would be added under the
proposed national government would “assimilate it to the Govt. of individual
states.”237 On July 14, Madison rhetorically “called for a single instance in
which the General Government was not to operate on the people
individually.”238 He then made the oft quoted statement that, to many
lawyers and judges, epitomizes the idea of American federalism: “The
practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as
political bodies has been exploded on all hands.”239 But Madison was a
relative newcomer to this idea, having previously thought that national
coercion of the states was an essential element of federalism. In any case,
with this remark, Madison was not stating a theory of federalism, let alone
proposing one. He was parroting the argument advanced by Wilson and King
that proportional representation in the Senate was the just and necessary
reciprocal consequence of the national government’s power to regulate the
people directly, rather than through the states.240 At this point in the debate,
the federal negative had not yet been rejected, and Madison still evidently
hoped that direct federal control over state legislation was going to be part of
the Constitution.
On the next two Convention days, July 16 and 17, Madison suffered
crushing defeats, as the two proposals of greatest importance to him were
successively voted down. On July 16, the Convention narrowly adopted the
Great Compromise, rejecting proportional representation in the Senate in
favor of equal state suffrage.241 On July 17, the Convention rejected the
federal negative.242 As a result of these defeats, as Bilder has observed,
“Madison was intellectually stuck.”243 His notes of the July 17 debate over
233. 2 id. at 6.
234. Id. at 7.
235. See 1 id. at 446–47.
236. See id.
237. Id. at 447.
238. 2 id. at 9.
239. Id. For Supreme Court quotations of this line, see, for example, Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 714 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 164 (1992).
240. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 6 (King); id. at 10 (Wilson).
241. See id. at 13.
242. See id. at 22.
243. BILDER, supra note 7, at 114.
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the negative—“recorded briefly and half-heartedly”244 after the proposal
went down in flames—are revealing. Other than his own speech defending
the negative, with arguments repeated from his June 8 speech, Madison
summarized the opposing speeches in one or two sentences each.245
Gouverneur Morris argued that the negative “would be terrible to the states,
and not necessary, if sufficient legislative authority should be given to the
general government.”246 Sherman agreed that it was unnecessary, since “the
courts of the states would not consider as valid any law contravening the
authority of the Union, and which the legislature would wish to be
negatived.”247 Madison responded that state laws “will accomplish their
injurious objects before they can be repealed by the Genl Legislre. or be set
aside by the National Tribunals” and that state judges could not be trusted to
uphold federal laws.248 Morris countered that “[a] law that ought to be
negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary department, and if that security
should fail; may be repealed by a Nationl. law.”249 Sherman argued that an
unconstitutional state law would be void even if not prevented by a legislative
negative.250 Immediately after the rejection of Madison’s negative, Luther
Martin’s motion to incorporate what eventually became the Supremacy
Clause251 passed unanimously; Madison included no debate on it, though
there would likely have been speeches, at a minimum to move and second
the proposal and explain it.252
This segment of the proceedings should be unpacked, because it was allimportant to the non-Madisonian theory of federalism built into the
Constitution. Where state laws interfered with the federal Constitution, laws,
or treaties, by imposing conflicting obligations on individuals, those state
laws would be invalidated, not at the point of enactment, as Madison had
insisted on, but at the point of enforcement. Individuals who are burdened
under a state law that is repugnant to the federal constitution, laws, or treaties
could challenge those laws in federal or state court, where the Supremacy
Clause required that the federal law control the case. Though moved by
Martin on July 17, the original proposal for a judicially enforced Supremacy
Clause was included in the New Jersey Plan one month earlier.253 It was
later enlarged by Wilson and the Committee of Detail to cover countervailing
state constitutional provisions as well as other state laws.254 The solution,
imperfect as it may be, is what we now know as federal supremacy, judicial
review, and preemption. The Supremacy Clause operates as a fundamental
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choice-of-law rule binding on “the judges in every State.”255 Numerous
Convention delegates clearly understood how this clause would implement
federal supremacy and cover the same ground as the national legislative veto
but in a manner less “terrible to the states.”256 The best lawyers among them
probably understood how courts well versed in choice-of-law problems
would proceed when multiple sovereignties were involved.257 The New
Jersey Plan that originally included the Supremacy Clause, for example, was
authored by former New Jersey attorney general and future U.S. Supreme
Court Justice William Paterson, with likely input from New Jersey Supreme
Court Justice David Brearley.258 The legally sophisticated Gouverneur
Morris later explained that, in light of it, federal legislation could in effect
“repeal” state laws.259 Morris’s assumption that the federal negative would
be unnecessary by giving “sufficient legislative authority” to Congress
implies a conception of affirmative legislative power with which lawyers
were familiar.260 But Madison’s desultory account of this all-important
debate raises the question of how well he understood the Supremacy Clause
and the concept of judicially enforced preemption.
Whether or not Madison fully understood how this process would work,
he evidently believed that it would not work. As he complained to Jefferson
in his remarkable October 1787 Convention postmortem, rejection of the
negative resulted in the Convention’s failure to solve “the evil of imperia in
imperio.”261 Thus, Madison concluded, “it is evident I think that without the
royal negative or some equivalent controul, the unity of the system would be
destroyed.”262 Madison continued to reject the notion that “the Judicial
authority under our new system will keep the States within their proper limits,
and supply the place of a negative on their laws,” because “a State which
would violate the Legislative rights of the Union, would not be very ready to
obey a Judicial decree in support of them.”263 Again, if this is correct, then
the same disobedience would have undermined his negative—a problem
Madison never squarely confronted.

255. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
256. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 27 (Morris).
257. Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997) (noting that eighteenth-century
courts “applied the law of other sovereigns all the time”).
258. See DONALD SCARINCI, DAVID BREARLEY AND THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 18, 171 (2005).
259. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 28.
260. For instance, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 30 (1824), Daniel Webster
argued “Congress has no power of revoking State laws, as a distinct power. It legislates over
subjects; and over those subjects which are within its power, its legislation is supreme, and
necessarily overrules all inconsistent or repugnant State legislation.” See also Caleb Nelson,
Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 236–53 (2000) (arguing that the Framers understood that
affirmative federal laws would abrogate contrary state laws under the Supremacy Clause).
261. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 87, at 212.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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Some commentators have tried to rehabilitate Madison’s federal negative
on the ground that it anticipated the Fourteenth Amendment.264 After all, the
argument goes, it was Madison who insisted that states posed the greatest
threat to civil liberties, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of rights
against the states for all practical purposes vindicated his vision. There are
undoubtedly parallels between the federal negative and the Fourteenth
Amendment, but to retrofit the latter as “Madisonian” seems questionable
and arguably indulges the tendency to automatically credit Madison with
virtually every significant constitutional idea, especially when it comes to
federalism and rights. Doing so also treats these two structural remedies at a
level of abstraction that makes the comparisons hollow. Madison’s federal
negative was a proposal designed to avoid the two enforcement mechanisms
supplied by the Fourteenth Amendment: judicial review and affirmative
federal legislation.265 Those remedies were implicit in the approach
advocated by other delegates but that Madison complained were inadequate.
This is to say nothing about the irony of crediting Madison with anticipating
an amendment designed to remedy an antebellum constitutional evil—
domestic slavery and its myriad associated forms of racial discrimination and
oppression—that Madison did so much during the course of his career to
protect from federal interference.266
3. A Madisonian National Legislature: Vortex or Vacuum?
Madison seems to have been unable to understand, or at least unwilling to
credit, that states could be controlled without a federal negative through the
exercise of affirmative legislative power regulating the people directly,
coupled with a judicially enforced supremacy clause. This notable gap was
consistent with what appears to have been Madison’s general aversion to
legislation. His primary analysis of the vices of the Confederation was the
profusion of unjust state laws that encroached on federal jurisdiction, on
other states, and on property rights within the states. One of the vices, indeed,
was too much state legislation.267 His proposed solution to this problem was
the federal negative, a check on state legislation.
But Madison’s thinking about the national government at the Convention
was also dominated by checks on federal legislation. Throughout June, his
speeches emphasized “the necessity of providing more effectually for the
security of private rights.”268 The national legislature was no different from
those of the states in its “tendency . . . to throw all power into the Legislative

264. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 63, at 191 (describing Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as “arguably the most Madisonian element of our Constitution”); James S.
Liebman & Brandon L. Garrett, Madisonian Equal Protection, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 837
(2004) (invoking Madison to gain acceptance of a progressive theory of Fourteenth
Amendment judicial review).
265. See supra Part II.A.
266. See infra note 310 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
268. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 134.
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vortex.”269 The Senate was to act as a negative within the national
legislature: its purpose was not only to wield the negative over state laws but
also “to protect the people against their rulers” and against their own
“transient impressions,” which presumably would be voted into bills in the
lower house.270 Since these “transient impressions” tended to produce paper
money and debtor relief, Madison left little doubt that the Senate would
protect creditors’ rights. Robert Yates recorded Madison as saying that the
Senate would “protect the minority of the opulent against the majority.”271
For Madison, a council of revision would provide still another check on
legislation; when this proposal failed, he supported an executive veto subject
to override only with a near-impossible three-fourths majority in
Congress.272 His beloved federal negative would also check national
legislation by requiring time-consuming congressional oversight of the
profusion of state laws, thereby crowding out affirmative national legislation.
Finally, the extended republic would itself tend to check legislation, at least
to Madison’s way of thinking, by making majority coalitions difficult to form
in the national councils.
While Madison’s vision of the legislative process was filled with checks
and negatives, he had comparatively little to say about affirmative legislative
powers. His pre-Convention letters mentioned “compleat authority in all
cases which require uniformity; such as the regulation of trade, including the
right of taxing both exports & imports, the fixing the terms and forms of
naturalization &c. &c.”273 At the Convention, when Roger Sherman asserted
that national powers should extend only to defense, diplomacy, foreign
commerce, “and a few lesser matters,” Madison expressly “differed from”
Sherman only to add “the necessity of providing more effectually for the
security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of justice.”274 During
the first half of the Convention, Madison believed the question of national
legislative powers should be deferred, either because of its difficulty or lack
of agreement on the legislature’s structure.275 Other delegates wanted to
consider powers first, then structure.276 When Madison finally turned his
attention to the question of affirmative powers in the weeks following the
Committee of Detail’s report in August, his efforts were sporadic and
unsystematic. For Wilson and other nationalists, the core problem with the
Confederation government was that it did too little, and Wilson accordingly
drafted the Necessary and Proper Clause277 to promote “capable federalism”
and empower Congress to legislate on behalf of the common defense and
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general welfare.278 Madison apparently did not agree, and he spent a good
part of his career after the Convention fashioning constitutional arguments
designed to limit the scope of federal legislative authority.279
B. The Enduring Myth of Federalist 10
Federalist 10 is widely held to be the most important piece of theoretical
writing about the Constitution ever published.280 The essay lays out
Madison’s famous theory of the extended republic in which the great size of
the United States will create such a multiplicity of factional interests that
none will likely be able to form a dominant majority that can tyrannize
minority interests. Together with its elaboration in Federalist 14 and its coda
in Federalist 51, Federalist 10 was the “final statement—but also the first
public one” of Madison’s extended republic theory.281 Less developed
versions—or in some cases, hints of it—can also be found scattered through
the Convention corpus.282 Whether Federalist 10 lives up to its reputation
for brilliance—and we have our doubts—it is quite true that, as Larry Kramer
observes, scholars “imagine the Constitution to be built on Madisonian
foundations” because of “Madison’s uniquely original ideas about the role of
an extended republic in controlling faction” in Federalist 10.283
Granting its powerful rhetorical effect that has captivated so many readers
since Beard first redirected attention to this essay in 1913,284 why do we
question the analytical brilliance and genuine importance of Federalist 10?
To begin with, Federalist 10 is not a theory of federalism. By the time
Madison published this essay, the people of New York and other states were
considering the Constitution as proposed by the Convention—without
Madison’s negative. Madison did not offer the extended republic theory as
a justification for any particular federalism structure or for federalism in
general. He did not explain how the extended republic would control factious
legislation in the states, which he had repeatedly insisted was the primary
cause of constitutional reform. As Rakove perceptively observes, Federalist
278. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 10; accord 1 id. at 483–84; see also Mikhail,
supra note 152; David S. Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising: Implied Powers,
Capable Federalism, and the Limits of Enumerationism, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 573 (2017).
279. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 49, at 223 (James Madison) (arguing
for a narrow interpretation of the General Welfare Clause); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra
note 49, at 247 (James Madison) (“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined.”); Primus, supra note 12; David S. Schwartz, Mr.
Madison’s War on the General Welfare Clause (2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors).
280. See, e.g., Alan Gibson, Madison’s Republican Remedy: The Tenth Federalist and the
Creation of an Impartial Republic, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE FEDERALIST 263
(Jack N. Rakove & Colleen A. Sheehan eds., 2020) (“Madison’s famous essay has been
rivalled only by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution itself as the most
important political writing of the American founding.”).
281. RAKOVE, supra note 63, at 9.
282. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 27, at 136 (Madison’s June 6 speech);
MADISON, supra note 47, at 354 (the eleventh vice).
283. Kramer, supra note 201, at 611, 615.
284. See BEARD, supra note 17, at 14.
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10 “identifies a set of political conditions that will make it possible to regard
a national government as remaining republican in character.”285 By itself,
the extended republic theory is at best an argument that the national
government will be less faction ridden than state governments and therefore
“produce results superior to those found in the states.”286 But, significantly,
it does not purport to explain the distribution of power or even the
relationship between the national government and the states.
Madison was correct to recognize a basic tension between the imperative
to maintain respect for individual rights and the majority-rule element at the
core of republican government. And his core observation that society
comprises factional interests was undoubtedly a theoretical advance over
earlier eighteenth-century political theories dividing society into “the one,
the few, and the many.”287 But Madison’s fundamental premise, that
factional takeover was less likely at the national level, while a plausible idea,
was not as well thought through as its admirers lead us to believe. The mere
notion of size does all the analytical work. Worse, Madison failed to consider
how readily the interests that cause factions within a state—debtors, for
example, or perhaps more plausibly, slaveholders—can cross state lines and
grow commensurately to play a comparably influential or even amplified role
at a national level. Instead, Madison seemed to assume that interests would
not cross state lines sufficiently to produce nationwide majority factions.
That was a rather dubious assumption for a political observer who came of
age during the American Revolution, when the colonies formed a
transcontinental faction to resist taxes, boycott imports, and eventually wage
war against imperial Britain, and when the “contagion of liberty” generated
by these events spawned America’s first abolitionist societies whose activism
spilled over state lines.288 Madison also failed to acknowledge that minority
factions could capture a state or national legislature—something Madison
would soon charge the Federalists with doing and that should have been
obvious even in 1787.289
As Kramer has demonstrated, Madison’s much-celebrated theory of the
extended republic got little or no traction at the Convention.290 Moreover, it
had little or no discernable impact on the ratification debates and was
285. Jack Rakove, A Biography of Madison’s Notes of Debates, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 317,
344 (2016) (reviewing BILDER, supra note 7).
286. Id.
287. We are indebted to Jack Rakove for this observation. See Email from Jack Rakove,
Professor of Hist. & Am. Stud., Stanford Univ., to authors (Mar. 24, 2021) (on file with
authors). The originality of Madison’s core observation nonetheless seems questionable. See
generally, e.g., ROBERT LEVERE BRUNHOUSE, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA,
1776–1790 (1942); H. JAMES HENDERSON, PARTY POLITICS IN THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
(1974); STAUGHTON LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (1967).
288. See, e.g., MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE CONFEDERATION, 1781–1789, at 135–36 (1950). See generally ARTHUR
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on Federalists as a minority faction).
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virtually ignored before 1913. Kramer suggests that its lack of influence
stems from the fact that Madison’s theory was so sophisticated that it flew
over the heads of his contemporaries.291 We question this interpretation and
suspect that the reasons are more basic than that: simply put, Madison’s
theory was simply irrelevant to the framing of the Constitution and remains
of limited value in understanding its theoretical foundations today.
Federalist 10 is a theory without a specific institutional proposal, and it
functioned primarily to rebut the Anti-Federalist argument from
Montesquieu that large republics were impossible. Yet, as Rakove observes,
“there is little evidence . . . that the Framers were sitting around worrying
about how to reconcile their agenda of constitutional change with
[Montesquieu’s] strictures on the size of republics.”292
Finally, it seems worth noting that Madison’s extended republic theory
likely had little or no impact on the Convention for another more basic
reason: a critical mass of delegates was already committed to conceiving the
United States as an “extended republic” before arriving in Philadelphia.
From the moment John Jay established the country’s new western boundary
along the Mississippi River during the Treaty of Paris negotiations,293 it was
clear to all informed observers that the United States would eventually
control an enormous land mass comprising half a continent. The Convention
was called to strengthen a government for the entire Union, including both
its extensive original seaboard and this vast western territory. The most
influential delegates (including Washington)294 intended that this
government should be a true national government, with supreme legislative,
executive, and judicial powers that acted directly on the people.
Furthermore, everyone assumed the new government would be republican;
no one seriously considered a monarchy or other nonrepublican forms. And
although several delegates occasionally bandied threats of breakup into
smaller confederacies, no one really considered smaller republics to be an
acceptable alternative to a continental government—an extended republic—
for the people of all thirteen states, along with the new states expected to join
the Union.295 As Mary Sarah Bilder, Daniel J. Hulsebosch, and other
291. Id. at 632, 645–48.
292. Rakove, supra note 285. Kramer’s explanation that the other Convention delegates
could not wrap their heads around Madison’s theory also may be undermined by Bilder’s
research on Madison’s Convention notes. Bilder has plausibly argued that the speeches and
writings Kramer relied on may have been written after the fact and essentially backdated by
Madison. See BILDER, supra note 7, at 45, 117, 244–45, 309 n.13. If this is correct, then it is
another reason why Madison’s extended republic theory might be less important than is
commonly assumed.
293. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE QUARTET: ORCHESTRATING THE SECOND AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, 1783–1789, at 67–68 (2015).
294. Id. at 109 (explaining that Washington “was, in truth, the most nationalistic of the
nationalists, because he had invested more than anyone else in making the American
Revolution succeed, and he had concluded during the course of the war that success entailed
a consolidated national government”).
295. Cf. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 87, at 206 (“No
proposition was made, no suggestion was thrown out, in favor of a partition of the Empire into
two or more Confederacies.”).
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scholars have explained, the Framers’ experience of the British Empire
taught them most of what they needed to know about the strengths and
limitations of a government with multilayered authority at the center and
periphery.296 They did not need to learn this from Madison.
CONCLUSION
The persistence of Madison’s unwarranted reputation as the father of the
Constitution297 distorts both constitutional history and constitutional law. It
overstates the significance of Madison’s ideas, occludes the contributions of
other delegates, and obscures the Framers’ actual designs and intentions.
Beyond its most basic features, such as its tripartite scheme of government
and bicameral legislature, which were expected and quickly supported by
virtually all of the delegates, the Constitution reported out on September 17
bore little resemblance to Madison’s specific suggestions before the
Convention. Most significantly, the final Constitution was not “Madisonian”
in any significant sense of that term. It was based on a theory of federalism—
of solving the problem of imperium in imperio—that diverged sharply from
Madison’s own vision. For Madison, the core problem of federalism was
state legislative interference with private rights, along with state legislative
obstruction of federal commands.298 His solution was to impose direct
control over the states in the form of a national legislative negative that would
in effect “assimilate” each state legislature into a compound national
legislature. But for the majority of the Framers, as reflected in the finished
Constitution, the core problem of federalism was the lack of affirmative
national power to tax and regulate the people directly. The solution was the
grant of affirmative legislative powers and a regime of judicially enforced
federal constitutional and legislative supremacy. Apart from the explicit
restrictions in Article I, Section 10, the states would be controlled as far as
necessary, and indirectly, through this regime. Madison may not have
appreciated or fully comprehended how that system would work; in any case,
he evidently believed it would not. These fundamental differences between
Madison’s vision and the finished product of the Convention by themselves
make the claim that he was the Constitution’s leading theorist, let alone its
“father,” unsustainable.
Stripping the unfounded paternity claim and preeminent constitutional
theorist label is only the first step in clearing away the remarkable mythology
that has built up around Madison. It is equally important to place Federalist
10 and other parts of Madison’s Convention corpus in a more accurate
historical perspective. Doing so has both methodological and substantive
aspects. Methodologically, we think it is essential for scholars to control for,
rather than give in to, the powerful confirmation bias and halo effects that
296. MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL
CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004); Hulsebosch, supra note 199; see also LaCroix, supra note
12, at 453–57.
297. See supra Part I.B.
298. See supra Part I.B.2.
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perpetuate the tenacious conventional wisdom about Madison. We see
confirmation bias in the tendency to slip into hagiography, overinterpret
Madison’s thin texts, credit him with originality for commonplace ideas,
resolve all doubts or ambiguities in his favor, and disregard conflicting or
unflattering evidence in the historical record. Avoiding confirmation bias
requires approaching Madison’s writings without the settled expectation that
he was the leading political theorist or constitutional oracle of the founding
generation, with unparalleled insight into the Constitution’s meaning.
Methodological rigor also requires setting aside various halo effects—such
as allowing Madison’s genuinely admirable qualities to color our
assessments of his life and work. Madison’s remarkable combination of
success as a politician and statesman, combined with his “adorkability”—his
shy, studious, and bookish personality—are endearing to academics.299 By
maintaining and preserving his own massive paper trail, Madison gave us
invaluable windows into more than fifty years of the political history of the
early republic. Historians are understandably grateful: Jack Rakove writes
that “Madison may well be regarded as a patron saint of American
history,”300 and Mary Sarah Bilder notes that the Library of Congress
classifies Madison’s notes of the Federal Convention as a “Top Treasure” in
its collection—as well they are.301 Furthermore, Madison’s efforts on behalf
of religious liberty and other individual rights, such as his 1785 “Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments” and his dogged pursuit
of what would become the Bill of Rights, are praiseworthy in many respects.
Arguably, Madison directly participated in more important episodes in the
constitutional history of the early republic than any other single individual.
We can acknowledge his admirable qualities and remarkable career without
unduly inflating his reputation or grossly exaggerating his contributions to
the founding.
Substantively, we suspect that a fresh assessment of Madison’s postConvention words and actions, from the Federalist essays through the end of
his life, will reveal a more accurate, and very different, portrait than that of
the nonpartisan constitutional sage. Rather than a deep constitutional thinker
and authoritative oracle, Madison might be better regarded as—in Rakove’s
apt phrase—“a politician thinking” and in particular, one often thinking up
constitutional arguments to win the dispute of the moment without due regard
for their longer-term implications. Madison was an early adopter—and
arguably the most influential practitioner—of the American penchant for
turning arguments over politics and policy into constitutional questions.
Once he clearly emerged as the leader of a national opposition party in the
1790s, his skepticism about “parchment barriers” faded and he recognized
the utility of using constitutional interpretation as the best available check on
299. See, e.g., FARRAND, supra note 3, at 17 (characterizing Madison as “essentially a
scholar in politics”); RAKOVE, supra note 63, at 15 (observing that in a less revolutionary era,
Madison would have gone to graduate school rather than entering politics).
300. RAKOVE, supra note 3, at 4.
301. BILDER, supra note 7, at 1.
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government actions he opposed. In this sense, the conventional “Madison
Problem” might not be the best way to produce an accurate portrait of
Madison as constitutional theorist. “Interpret the Constitution at all times to
defeat Hamiltonian political economy and implied national powers that could
threaten slavery” may be a consistent constitutional ideology, but it is a
dubious and inconsistent principle of constitutional interpretation.302
Yet this seems to be how Madison frequently operated. Based on what he
took to be the greatest policy challenge at a particular moment in time, he
devised a structural remedy or interpretive “principle,” only to abandon that
idea when changed circumstances converted his former solution into a
problem. When the challenge in 1787 was (in his view) faction-dominated
state legislatures running rampant with debt relief laws, paper money issues,
and other statutes that threatened “different kinds of property,”303 the
solution was an extended republican government with a national legislative
veto over state laws.304 When the challenge in 1798 was a faction-dominated
national legislature overreaching by enacting the Alien and Sedition Acts305
on the basis of implied national powers, the solution was, in effect, the
reverse: a state legislative veto over national laws.306 When the challenge
was a Federalist administration creating a national bank and embracing
Hamilton’s ideas about political economy in 1791, the solution was to appeal
to a government of limited and enumerated powers.307 But when the
challenge was the desperate need for a national bank to reign in rampant
currency nonconformity in 1816, Madison created an exception to limited
enumerated powers in cases where the violation of that principle lasted long
enough to furnish a different constitutional interpretation.308 Finally, when
the challenge in the 1830s was a state inappropriately (in Madison’s view)
using this veto against a national policy that did not rise to the level of the
Alien and Sedition Acts, the solution was to claim that his 1798 position on
federal-state relations was being misconstrued.309
Throughout his life, Madison cultivated a reputation for honesty, probity,
and ideological sincerity that most historians have largely accepted. The
actual record, however, suggests that he often engaged in tactics that, while
perhaps typical of politicians, are at odds with his reputation as an above-the302. Madison’s prominent role in attacking implied powers in favor of a “strict” conception
of enumerated powers is well known. What is perhaps less familiar is how inadequate those
arguments are. See, e.g., Robert J. Reinstein, The Aggregate and Implied Powers of the United
States, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 3 (2019); Schwartz, supra note 278.
303. MADISON, supra note 47, at 355.
304. See supra Part I.B.2.
305. An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798); Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1
Stat. 596.
306. See DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 27 (2019); Virginia Resolutions, supra note
9.
307. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 12.
308. See David S. Schwartz, Madison’s Waiver: Can Constitutional Liquidation be
Liquidated?, 72 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 21–22 (2019).
309. See, e.g., Gutzman, supra note 6.
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fray constitutional sage. In the Virginia ratifying convention, in the First
Federal Congress, as president, and at other points throughout his career,
Madison often made flimsy, opportunistic constitutional arguments, with
little regard for consistency and only a superficial concern for neutral
principles. On many occasions, he did so on behalf of the most unjust and
repressive institution in American history: chattel slavery. Although he is
not normally characterized in this fashion, Madison was arguably the most
brilliant and effective slave-power constitutionalist this country has ever
known, who perhaps was more responsible than any other single individual
for creating and shaping the “federal consensus” that protected slavery from
democracy for almost eight decades.310 Like the Garrisonians before them,
when Americans today conclude that the original Constitution was
proslavery, they are largely channeling Madison’s ideas. The original
Constitution, however, was not a proslavery constitution as that phrase is
usually understood. Most importantly, it vested the United States with the
implied power to abolish slavery, a power Madison did everything he
possibly could to kill and bury forever.
As we emphasized at the outset, our overriding purpose is not to “trash”
Madison but to start a new scholarly conversation about him. As that
conversation unfolds, with contributions by scholars from a variety of
perspectives, we hope that a more accurate and nuanced picture of Madison
will emerge. With his giant shadow reduced to more realistic, human
proportions, all of us will be better able to see and grasp alternative
understandings of the original Constitution.

310. For Madison’s role in taking advantage of the 1790 antislavery petitions to establish
the federal consensus, see JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY
GENERATION 81–119 (2000); GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION 191–
203 (2010); Howard A. Ohline, Slavery Economics and Congressional Politics, 1790, 46 J.S.
HIST. 335 (1980). In his book-length study of Madison and slavery, Drew McCoy concluded
that “Madison’s antislavery credentials can fairly be described as impeccable.” DREW R.
MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY 260
(1989). Needless to say, we disagree with this assessment.

